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英文文献：Managerial Overconfidence and Self-Reported Success-管理层的过度自信和自我报告的成功
英文文献作者：Nikolaj Kirkeby Niebuhr
英文文献摘要：
I consider the optimal contract for an overconfident manager in a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the contract is written on the earnings of the firm. Overconfidence causes the manager to overestimate his ability to affect the outcome of the firm. Overconfidence first reduces cost of agency, and if the level of overconfidence is significant enough, it causes the manager to wager on his wrong beliefs. The accounting system obscures the outcome of the manager's effort, which attenuates the effect of significant overconfidence and decreases the principal's profit. Inducing the manager to truthfully communicate his self-observed success allows the principal to directly contract on the cause of disagreement, the manager's effect on firm outcome. This reduces the risk premium for a slightly overconfident manager and emphasizes the wager effect for a significantly overconfident manager. The value of communication is first decreasing in overconfidence for a slightly overconfident manager and then increasing in overconfidence for a significantly overconfident manager.
在具有道德风险的委托代理模型中，我考虑了自负经理的最优契约，该契约以公司的收益为基础。过度自信使经理高估了他影响公司结果的能力。过度自信首先会降低代理成本，如果过度自信的程度足够显著，就会导致管理者将赌注押在错误的信念上。会计制度掩盖了管理者努力的结果，从而减弱了显著过度自信的影响，降低了委托人的利润。诱使经理真诚地与自己观察到的成功进行沟通，可以让委托人直接在分歧的原因上收缩，也就是经理对公司结果的影响。这降低了稍微过于自信的经理的风险溢价，并强调了明显过于自信的经理的下注效应。沟通的价值在轻度过度自信的管理者中首先会减少，而在重度过度自信的管理者中会增加。
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