[金融学论文] CFOs versus CEOs:Equity incentives and crashes [推广有奖]

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2464_1576338390 发表于 2020-6-5 12:48:17 |AI写论文

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股价崩盘的衡量指标测算

CFOs versus CEOs:Equity incentives and crashes
Jeong-Bon Kim a,1, YinghuaLi b, LiandongZhang a,n
a Department ofAccountancy,CityUniversityofHongKong,TatCheeAvenue,Kowloon,HongKong
b Baruch College,TheCityUniversityofNewYork,OneBernardBaruchWay,NewYork,NY10010-5585,USA
JFE

UsingalargesampleofU.S.firmsfortheperiod1993–2009,weprovideevidencethat
the sensitivityofachieffinancialofficer’s(CFO)optionportfoliovaluetostockpriceis
significantlyandpositivelyrelatedtothefirm’sfuturestockpricecrashrisk.Incontrast,
we findonlyweakevidenceofthepositiveimpactofchiefexecutiveofficeroption
sensitivityoncrashrisk.Finally,wefindthatthelinkbetweenCFOoptionsensitivity
and crashriskismorepronouncedforfirmsinnon-competitiveindustriesandthose
with ahighleveloffinancialleverage.