[基础问答] 管理层信托责任问题经典论文Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem [推广有奖]

0关注
0粉丝

已卖：669份资源

大专生

31%

还不是VIP/贵宾

威望: 0 级
论坛币: 1481 个
通用积分: 0.3600
学术水平: 1 点
热心指数: 1 点
信用等级: 0 点
经验: 1288 点
帖子: 34
精华: 0
在线时间: 40 小时
注册时间: 2010-8-27
最后登录: 2024-7-11

楼主

kooood 发表于 2010-9-6 09:55:30 |AI写论文

是否 +2 论坛币

k人参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

篇名 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
作者 Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Jess M.Fried
关键词 Executive Compensation,Agency Problem
刊名 The Journal of Economic Perspectives
年份 2003
卷期 V.17 No.3
页 71
摘要：
Executive compensation has long attracted a great deal of attention from financial economists. Indeed, the increase in academic papers on the subject of CEO compensation during the 1990s seems to have outpaced even the remarkable increase in CEO pay itself during this period (Murphy, 1999).Much research has focused on how executive compensation schemes can help alleviate the agency problem in publicly traded companies.