摘要翻译:
算法共谋是当前人工智能时代的一个新兴概念。算法合谋是否是一个可信的威胁仍然是一个论点。本文提出了一种在Cournot双寡头竞争市场中敲诈人类竞争对手合谋的算法。实验表明,该算法能够成功地敲诈人类竞争对手,并在长期内获得较高的收益,同时人类竞争对手会完全与算法合谋。其结果是,社会福利迅速而稳定地下降。无论是在理论上还是在实验上,我们的工作都证实,算法合谋可能是一个可信的威胁。在实际应用中,我们希望本文的框架、算法设计和实验环境能够成为研究者和决策者处理新出现的算法合谋的孵化器或试验台。
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英文标题:
《Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from
Experimental Economics》
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作者:
Nan Zhou, Li Zhang, Shijian Li, Zhijian Wang
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最新提交年份:
2018
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Econometrics 计量经济学
分类描述:Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论,微观计量经济学,宏观计量经济学,通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容,统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类:Statistics 统计学
二级分类:Applications 应用程序
分类描述:Biology, Education, Epidemiology, Engineering, Environmental Sciences, Medical, Physical Sciences, Quality Control, Social Sciences
生物学,教育学,流行病学,工程学,环境科学,医学,物理科学,质量控制,社会科学
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一级分类:Statistics 统计学
二级分类:Machine Learning 机器学习
分类描述:Covers machine learning papers (supervised, unsupervised, semi-supervised learning, graphical models, reinforcement learning, bandits, high dimensional inference, etc.) with a statistical or theoretical grounding
覆盖机器学习论文(监督,无监督,半监督学习,图形模型,强化学习,强盗,高维推理等)与统计或理论基础
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英文摘要:
Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept in current artificial intelligence age. Whether algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algorithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extorted its human rival and gets higher profit in long run, meanwhile the human rival will fully collude with the algorithm. As a result, the social welfare declines rapidly and stably. Both in theory and in experiment, our work confirms that, algorithmic collusion can be a creditable threat. In application, we hope, the frameworks, the algorithm design as well as the experiment environment illustrated in this work, can be an incubator or a test bed for researchers and policymakers to handle the emerging algorithmic collusion.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.08061