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摘要翻译：
本文研究了经典剩余提取问题的一个鲁棒版本，其中设计者只知道每种类型的信念属于某个集合，并设计了适合于该集合中所有可能信念的机制。我们导出了在这种情况下完全提取的充要条件，并证明了这些充要条件是Cremer和McLean(1985，1988)所证明的经典凸独立条件的自然集值类似。我们表明，完全提取既不是一般的可能，也不是一般的不可能，这与标准设置相反，在标准设置中，完全提取是一般的。当完全提取失败时，我们证明了自然附加条件可以限制设计者可以提供的合同的性质和设计者可以获得的剩余。
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英文标题：
《Uncertainty and Robustness of Surplus Extraction》
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作者：
Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, and Chris Shannon
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
This paper studies a robust version of the classic surplus extraction problem, in which the designer knows only that the beliefs of each type belong to some set, and designs mechanisms that are suitable for all possible beliefs in that set. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for full extraction in this setting, and show that these are natural set-valued analogues of the classic convex independence condition identified by Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988). We show that full extraction is neither generically possible nor generically impossible, in contrast to the standard setting in which full extraction is generic. When full extraction fails, we show that natural additional conditions can restrict both the nature of the contracts a designer can offer and the surplus the designer can obtain.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.01320
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