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摘要翻译：
我们开发了一个类似于有限承诺机制设计揭示原理的工具。在一个不知情的设计者和一个私下知情的代理人之间的机制选择博弈中，我们确定了一个足够丰富的机制的规范类，以复制任何均衡的收益。我们方法论的一个基石是这样一个想法，即一个机制不仅应该编码决定分配的规则，而且应该编码设计者从与代理的交互中获得的信息。因此，设计师学习多少，这是有限承诺设计中的关键张力，成为设计的明确部分。我们展示了如何利用这种洞察力将设计师的问题转化为一个约束优化问题：在通常的说实话和参与约束之外，必须增加设计师的顺序合理性约束。
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英文标题：
《Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment》
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作者：
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the payoffs of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. We show how this insight can be used to transform the designer's problem into a constrained optimization one: To the usual truthtelling and participation constraints, one must add the designer's sequential rationality constraint.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03579
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