网络游戏中的学习与自确认均衡

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摘要翻译：
考虑一组反复玩网络游戏的代理。代理可能不知道网络。他们甚至可能不知道他们正在与网络中的其他代理交互。可能，他们只是明白他们的收益取决于一个未知的状态，这个状态实际上是他们邻居行动的集合。每一次，每个代理选择一个行动，使她的瞬时主观期望收益最大化，然后根据她的观察更新她的信念。特别地，我们假设每个代理人只观察她已实现的收益。得到的动态的稳定状态是给定假定反馈的自确认平衡。给出了给定类网络游戏中自确认均衡集的结构，将自确认与纳什均衡联系起来，并分析了极限点为自确认均衡的简单猜想最佳回复路径。
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英文标题：
《Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games》
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作者：
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fabrizio Panebianco and Paolo Pin
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an unknown state that is, actually, an aggregate of the actions of their neighbors. Each time, every agent chooses an action that maximizes her instantaneous subjective expected payoff and then updates her beliefs according to what she observes. In particular, we assume that each agent only observes her realized payoff. A steady state of the resulting dynamic is a selfconfirming equilibrium given the assumed feedback. We characterize the structure of the set of selfconfirming equilibria in the given class of network games, we relate selfconfirming and Nash equilibria, and we analyze simple conjectural best-reply paths whose limit points are selfconfirming equilibria.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.11775

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关键词：网络游戏 Applications Contribution Coordination Environments 假定 知道 observes agents given