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[经济学] 非线性主体的简单机理 [推广有奖]

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何人来此 在职认证  发表于 2022-3-8 12:31:25 来自手机 |AI写论文

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摘要翻译:
我们考虑具有私人价值和私人预算给定的非线性偏好的代理。我们量化的程度,张贴的定价近似优化福利和收入为一个单一的代理。我们给出了一个约简框架,将基于多Agent定价机制的近似从线性效用扩展到非线性效用。这一削减框架广泛适用于Alaei等人。(2012)已经表明,线性代理的机制通常可以解释为基于定价的机制。我们给出了该框架在遗忘张贴定价(例如,Chawla et al.,2010)、顺序张贴定价(例如,Yan,2011)和虚拟盈余最大化(Myerson,1981)中的应用实例。
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英文标题:
《Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents》
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作者:
Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline, Yingkai Li
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:

一级分类:Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类:Economics        经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
  We consider agents with non-linear preferences given by private values and private budgets. We quantify the extent to which posted pricing approximately optimizes welfare and revenue for a single agent. We give a reduction framework that extends the approximation of multi-agent pricing-based mechanisms from linear utility to nonlinear utility. This reduction framework is broadly applicable as Alaei et al. (2012) have shown that mechanisms for linear agents can generally be interpreted as pricing-based mechanisms. We give example applications of the framework to oblivious posted pricing (e.g., Chawla et al., 2010), sequential posted pricing (e.g., Yan, 2011), and virtual surplus maximization (Myerson, 1981).
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.00545
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关键词:非线性 Applications Contribution Coordination Environments 价值 虚拟 实例 Alaei 具有

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