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摘要翻译：
本文研究了在大学招生市场中，学生可以在不同的财务条件下上同一所大学的稳定分配集。稳定的延期接受机制隐含地根据成绩分配资金。在匈牙利，中央机制是基于延期受理的，一种替代的稳定算法将改变9.3%的申请人的分配，并将分配的申请人数量增加2%。社会经济地位较低的申请人和边缘地区的大学从这种不以成绩为基础的算法中获得了不成比例的好处。这些发现与配对（无合同）文献的发现形成鲜明对比。
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英文标题：
《Need versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets》
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作者：
P\'eter Bir\'o and Avinatan Hassidim and Assaf Romm and Ran I. Shorrer
and S\'andor S\'ov\'ag\'o
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
This paper studies the set of stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The stable deferred acceptance mechanism implicitly allocates funding based on merit. In Hungary, where the centralized mechanism is based on deferred acceptance, an alternate stable algorithm would change the assignment of 9.3 percent of the applicants, and increase the number of assigned applicants by 2 percent. Low socioeconomic status applicants and colleges in the periphery benefit disproportionately from moving to this non-merit-based algorithm. These findings stand in sharp contrast to findings from the matching (without contracts) literature.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.08631
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