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摘要翻译：
开发和部署匹配程序，激励真实的偏好报告，被认为是市场设计研究的主要成功之一。在本研究中，我们测试了这些程序在消除偏好虚假陈述方面的成功程度。我们对1714名医学生进行了在线实验，他们参加了医学住院医师匹配--策略证明市场设计的领先领域应用。当被置于一个类似的激励匹配任务中时，我们发现23%的参与者歪曲了他们的偏好。我们探讨了预测偏好错误陈述的因素，包括认知能力、战略定位、过度自信、期望、建议和信任。我们讨论了这种行为对分配机制设计和使用它们的市场的社会福利的影响。
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英文标题：
《An Experimental Investigation of Preference Misrepresentation in the
Residency Match》
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作者：
Alex Rees-Jones and Samuel Skowronek
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Econometrics 计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match--a leading field application of strategy-proof market design. When placed in an analogous, incentivized matching task, we find that 23% of participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.01990
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