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摘要翻译：
我介绍了一个评分模型。中介将发送者的多个特征聚合成一个分数。接球手看到这个分数并做出决定。接收者希望他的决定与发送者的潜在特征相匹配。但是发件人想要最有利的决定，她可以以私人成本扭曲她的每一个特征。我刻画了接收者最优得分规则。该规则低估了一些特征的权重，以防止发送者失真，并过重了其他特征，以保持得分无偏见。接收者更喜欢这个分数而不是看到发送者的全部特征，因为更粗糙的信息减轻了他的承诺问题。
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英文标题：
《Scoring Strategic Agents》
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作者：
Ian Ball
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
I introduce a model of scoring. An intermediary aggregates multiple features of a sender into a score. A receiver sees this score and takes a decision. The receiver wants his decision to match the sender's latent characteristic. But the sender wants the most favorable decision, and she can distort each of her features at a private cost. I characterize the receiver-optimal scoring rule. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features to keep the score unbiased. The receiver prefers this score to seeing the sender's full features because the coarser information mitigates his commitment problem.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.01888
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