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摘要翻译：
针对电力市场中的市场力问题，我们在前人的工作中提出了一个线性成本的两个代理简化市场的机制。在标准采购拍卖中，由二次传输损失产生的市场力量允许生产者出价高于其真实价值，即其生产成本。前文提出的机制最大限度地减少了生产者的利润，使社会受益。本文将这些结果推广到由有限个具有分段线性成本函数的代理组成的更一般的市场，这使得问题更加困难，但同时也更加现实。我们表明，该方法适用于一大类外部性。我们还提供了一个解决主分配问题的算法。我们的贡献为评估实践中使用的机制的次优性提供了一个基准。
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英文标题：
《Optimal auctions for networked markets with externalities》
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作者：
Benjamin Heymann and Alejandro Jofr\'e
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Mathematics 数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control 优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
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英文摘要：
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the quadratic transmission losses allows the producers to bid above their true values, which are their production cost. The mechanism proposed in the previous paper optimally reduces the producers' margin to the society's benefit. In this paper, we extend those results to a more general market made of a finite number of agents with piecewise linear cost functions, which makes the problem more difficult, but simultaneously more realistic. We show that the methodology works for a large class of externalities. We also provide an algorithm to solve the principal allocation problem. Our contribution provides a benchmark to assess the sub-optimality of the mechanisms used in practice.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.10080
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