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摘要翻译：
接收者如何设计信息结构以便从发送者那里获取信息？我们研究决策者如何通过减少自己对agent所传递信息的观察能力来从agent获得更多信息。直观地说，当双方的偏好不完全对齐时，这种乱七八糟的做法放松了发送者对接收者将她的信息用于发送者不利的担忧。我们刻画了接收机的最优信息结构。主要结果是，在广泛的条件下，接收者可以做得就像她可以承诺一个将发送者的消息映射到行动的规则一样好：信息设计和完全承诺一样好。类似地，我们表明这些条件保证了事先信息的获取总是有利于接收者，即使这种学习实际上可能降低接收者在没有含糊不清的情况下的预期收益。我们用一系列经济相关的例子来说明这些影响。
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英文标题：
《Bayesian Elicitation》
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作者：
Mark Whitmeyer
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
How can a receiver design an information structure in order to elicit information from a sender? We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. Intuitively, when the two parties' preferences are not perfectly aligned, this garbling relaxes the sender's concern that the receiver will use her information to the sender's disadvantage. We characterize the optimal information structure for the receiver. The main result is that under broad conditions, the receiver can do just as well as if she could commit to a rule mapping the sender's message to actions: information design is just as good as full commitment. Similarly, we show that these conditions guarantee that ex ante information acquisition always benefits the receiver, even though this learning might actually lower the receiver's expected payoff in the absence of garbling. We illustrate these effects in a range of economically relevant examples.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.00976
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