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摘要翻译：
一组专家，例如气候科学家，将在F$和G$两种政策中做出选择。考虑以下决策规则。如果所有专家都同意$F$的预期效用高于$G$的预期效用，则适用一致规则，并选择$F$。否则，执行预防原则，并选择产生最高最小期望效用的策略。当加入不确定度的部分分解的中间周期时，该判决规则可能导致时间不一致。我们提供的公理扩大了拥有否决权的初始专家群体，这导致了一组在最小意义上是“矩形”的概率信念。这使得该决策规则动态一致，并作为副产品提供了一种新颖的矩形行为表征。
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英文标题：
《Dynamically Consistent Objective and Subjective Rationality》
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作者：
Lorenzo Bastianello, Jos\'e Heleno Faro, Ana Santos
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
A group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to choose among two policies $f$ and $g$. Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the expected utility of $f$ is higher than the expected utility of $g$, the unanimity rule applies, and $f$ is chosen. Otherwise the precautionary principle is implemented and the policy yielding the highest minimal expected utility is chosen. This decision rule may lead to time inconsistencies when an intermediate period of partial resolution of uncertainty is added. We provide axioms that enlarge the initial group of experts with veto power, which leads to a set of probabilistic beliefs that is "rectangular" in a minimal sense. This makes this decision rule dynamically consistent and provides, as a byproduct, a novel behavioral characterization of rectangularity.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.12347
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