如何销售硬信息

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摘要翻译：
资产的卖方有权从中间人那里购买有关资产价值的硬信息。然后，卖方可以在竞争市场中出售资产之前披露所获得的信息。我们研究中介如何设计和销售硬信息，以稳健地最大化她的收入在所有均衡。尽管中介机构可以使用准确的测试来揭示资产的价值，但我们表明稳健的收益最大化导致了一个噪声测试，该测试具有连续的可能分数，这些分数呈指数分布。此外，中介总是向卖方收取向市场披露考试分数的费用，但不一定收取运行考试的费用。这使得中介机构能够稳健地从资产出售产生的盈余中获得相当大的份额，即使测试产生的信息没有提供社会价值。
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英文标题：
《How to Sell Hard Information》
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作者：
S. Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, Xiao Lin, Ron Siegel
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the intermediary designs and sells hard information to robustly maximize her revenue across all equilibria. Even though the intermediary could use an accurate test that reveals the asset's value, we show that robust revenue maximization leads to a noisy test with a continuum of possible scores that are distributed exponentially. In addition, the intermediary always charges the seller for disclosing the test score to the market, but not necessarily for running the test. This enables the intermediary to robustly appropriate a significant share of the surplus resulting from the asset sale even though the information generated by the test provides no social value.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.08037

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关键词：如何销售 获得 市场 information seller value