摘要翻译:
我们研究了与策略证明的社会选择函数相关的直接启示机制的次优纳什均衡的似然性。通过使用最近引入的经验均衡分析(Velez and Brown,2019,ARXIV:1804.07986),我们确定只有当社会选择函数违反非专横条件且信息不在内部时,这种行为才是可信的。对这些游戏积累的实验和经验证据的分析支持了我们的发现。
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英文标题:
《Empirical strategy-proofness》
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作者:
Rodrigo A. Velez and Alexander L. Brown
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要:
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019, arXiv:1804.07986) we determine that this behavior is plausible only when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition and information is not interior. Analysis of the accumulated experimental and empirical evidence on these games supports our findings.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.12408