通过考虑具有相关值的设置,我们扩展了关于同时物品拍卖的无政府状态(PoA)价格的文献;我们通过相互依赖价值的基本经济模型(IDV)来做到这一点。众所周知,在具有私有值的多项设置中,相关值可能导致糟糕的PoA,其代理数可能是多项式大的$N$。在更一般的IDV模型中,我们证明了即使在单项目设置下PoA也可以是多项式大的。从积极的方面来看,我们发现了市场中信息分散的一个自然条件,称为$\\γ$-异质性,这使得良好的PoA保证成为可能。在此条件下,我们证明了对于单项设置,标准机制的PoA以$\\gamma$的形式优雅地下降。对于具有$M>1$items的设置,我们展示了两个域之间的分离:如果$N\\geq M$,我们设计了一个新的同时拍卖项目,在有限的信息不对称下具有良好的PoA(相对于$\\gamma$)。据我们所知,这是多项设置中相关值的第一个积极的PoA结果。建立这一结果的主要技术困难是,建立PoA结果的标准工具--平滑度框架--不适用于IDV设置,因此我们必须引入新的技术来应对这种设置带来的独特挑战。在$N\\llM$域中,我们建立了不可能的结果,即使是对于令人惊讶的简单场景也是如此。
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英文标题:
《Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values》
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作者:
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Ori Zviran
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最新提交年份:
2021
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分类信息:
一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model of interdependent values (IDV). It is well-known that in multi-item settings with private values, correlated values can lead to bad PoA, which can be polynomially large in the number of agents $n$. In the more general model of IDV, we show that the PoA can be polynomially large even in single-item settings. On the positive side, we identify a natural condition on information dispersion in the market, termed $\\gamma$-heterogeneity, which enables good PoA guarantees. Under this condition, we show that for single-item settings, the PoA of standard mechanisms degrades gracefully with $\\gamma$. For settings with $m>1$ items we show a separation between two domains: If $n \\geq m$, we devise a new simultaneous item auction with good PoA (with respect to $\\gamma$), under limited information asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first positive PoA result for correlated values in multi-item settings. The main technical difficulty in establishing this result is that the standard tool for establishing PoA results -- the smoothness framework -- is unsuitable for IDV settings, and so we must introduce new techniques to address the unique challenges imposed by such settings. In the domain of $n \\ll m$, we establish impossibility results even for surprisingly simple scenarios.
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