发帖
雷达卡
Earnings Inequality and the Minimum Wage: Evidence fromBrazil最低工资和收入不平等：来自巴西的证据
Niklas Engbom ChristianMoser
Increases in theminimum wage can substantially reduce earnings inequality. To demonstrate this,we combine administrative and survey data with an equilibrium model of theBrazilian labor market. We find that a 128 percent increase in the real minimumwage in Brazil between 1996 and 2018 had far-reaching spillover effects onwages higher up in the distribution. The increased minimum wage accounts for 45percent of a large fall in earnings inequality over this period. At the sametime, the effects of the minimum wage on employment and output are muted byreallocation of workers toward more productive firms.
提高最低工资可以大大减少收入不平等。为了证明这一点，我们将行政和调查数据与巴西劳动力市场的均衡模型结合起来。我们发现，在1996年至2018年期间，巴西实际最低工资上涨了128%，这对收入分配中更高阶层的工资产生了深远的溢出效应。在此期间，收入不平等程度大幅下降，最低工资的提高在其中贡献了45%。与此同时，最低工资对就业和产出的影响由于工人向生产效率更高的企业的重新分配而减弱。
DOI:10.1257/aer.20181506
Interaction, Stereotypes, and Performance: Evidence fromSouth Africa交互、墨守成规和表现:来自南非的证据
Lucia Corno Eliana LaFerrara Justine Burns
We exploit a policy designed to randomlyallocate roommates in a large South African university to investigate whetherinterracial interaction affects stereotypes, attitudes and performance. Usingimplicit association tests, we find that living with a roommate of a differentrace reduces White students' negative stereotypes towards Black students andincreases interracial friendships. Interaction also affects academic outcomes:Black students improve their GPA, pass more exams and have lower dropout rates.This effect is not driven by roommate's ability.
我们利用南非一所大型大学随机分配室友的政策来研究种族间的互动是否会影响定型观念、态度和表现。通过隐性关联测试，我们发现，与不同种族的室友生活在一起会减少白人学生对黑人学生的负面刻板印象，并增加种族间的友谊。交往也会影响学业成绩。黑人学生提高了他们的GPA，通过了更多的考试并降低了辍学率。这种影响不是由室友的能力驱动的。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181805
Dynamic Matching in OverloadedWaiting Lists过度等待列表中的动态匹配
Jacob D. Leshno
This paper introduces a stylized modelto capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation mechanisms. First,agents choose among items with associated expected wait times. Waiting timesserve a similar role to that of monetary prices in directing agents' choicesand rationing items. Second, the expected wait for an item is endogenouslydetermined and randomly fluctuates over time. We evaluate welfare under theseendogenously determined waiting times and find that waiting time fluctuationslead to misallocation and welfare loss. A simple randomized assignment policycan reduce misallocation and increase welfare.
本文引入了一个程式化的模型来捕捉等待列表分配机制的独特特征。首先，代理在与预期等待时间相关的项目中进行选择。等待时间在指导代理人的选择和配给物品方面起着与货币价格类似的作用。其次，物品的预期等待时间是内生决定的，并随时间随机波动。我们在这些内生决定的等待时间下评估福利，发现等待时间的波动会导致分配不当和福利损失。简单的随机分配策略可以减少分配不当，提高福利。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201111
Optimality of Matched-PairDesigns in Randomized Controlled Trials随机对照试验中配对匹配的最优性
Yuehao Bai
In randomized controlled trials,treatment is often assigned by stratified randomization. I show that among allstratified randomization schemes that treat all units with probability onehalf, a certain matched-pair design achieves the maximum statistical precisionfor estimating the average treatment effect. In an important special case, theoptimal design pairs units according to the baseline outcome. In a simulationstudy based on datasets from ten randomized controlled trials, this designlowers the standard error for the estimator of the average treatment effect by10 percent on average, and by up to 34 percent, relative to the originaldesigns.
在随机对照试验中，处理通常是分层随机分配的。本文证明，在所有以1 / 2概率处理所有单元的分层随机化方案中，某个配对匹配在估计平均处理效应方面达到了最大的统计精度。在一个重要的特殊情况下，优化设计根据基准结果对单元进行匹配。在基于10个随机对照试验数据集的模拟研究中，与原始设计相比，这种设计将平均处理效应估计结果的标准误差平均降低了10%，最高可降低34%。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201856
Convex Supply Curves凸的供给曲线
Boyan Jovanovic ViktorTsyrennikov
We provide evidence that industries'supply curves are convex. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a modelin which capacity constraints at the firm level generate supply curves that areconvex in logs at the industry level. The industry's capacity utilization rateis a sufficient statistic for the supply elasticity. Using data on capacityutilization and three different instruments, we estimate the supply curve andfind robust evidence for an economically sizable degree of convexity. Thenonlinearity we identify has several macroeconomic implications, including thatresponses to shocks are state dependent and that the Phillips curve is convex.
我们提供的证据表明，行业的供给曲线是凸的。为了指导我们的实证分析，我们开发了一个模型，在该模型中，企业层面的能力约束产生了行业层面的对数凸供给曲线。该行业的产能利用率是供给弹性的充分统计数据。利用产能利用率数据和三种不同的工具变量，我们估计了供给曲线，并找到了经济上相当大的凸度的有力证据。我们确定的非线性具有几个宏观经济含义，包括对冲击的响应是依赖于状态的，以及菲利普斯曲线是凸的。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210811
Trading on Sunspots太阳黑子交易
Boyan Jovanovic ViktorTsyrennikov
In a model with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria,we show that the set of equilibria shrinks if we allow trade in assets that paybased on the realization of a sunspot acting as an equilibrium-selectiondevice. When the probability of a low-output outcome is high, the desire toinsure against it leads the poor to promise large transfers to the rich in thehigh-output state. The rich then lose the incentive to exert the effort neededto sustain the high output. Thus the opening of financial markets may destroythe high equilibrium.
在一个具有多个帕累托排序均衡的模型中，我们发现，如果我们允许基于实现太阳黑子作为均衡选择设备的资产进行交易，则均衡的解集将缩小。当出现低产出结果的概率很高时，为了防范这种情况，穷人承诺向高产出状态下的富人转移大笔资金。于是，富人就失去了付出维持高产出所需努力的动力。因此，金融市场的开放可能会破坏这种高度均衡。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210972
Learning from ManipulableSignals从可操纵信号中学习
Mehmet Ekmekci；Leandro Gorno；Lucas Maestri；Jian Sun；Dong Wei
We study adynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The principal graduallylearns about the agent's private type from a noisy performance measure that canbe manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fullycharacterize the unique Markov equilibrium of this game. We find thatterminations/market crashes are often preceded by a spike in manipulationintensity and (expected) performance. Moreover, due to endogenous signalmanipulation, too much transparency can inhibit learning and harm theprincipal. As the players get arbitrarily patient, the principal elicits nouseful information from the observed signal.
我们研究一个委托人和代理人之间的动态停止博弈。委托人从一个嘈杂的绩效指标中逐渐了解到代理人的私人类型，而代理人可以通过一个昂贵的隐藏行动来操纵这个指标。我们完全描述了这个博弈的唯一马尔科夫均衡。我们发现，在终止/市场崩溃之前，往往有一个操纵强度和（预期）业绩的高峰。此外，由于内生的信号操纵，过多的透明度会抑制学习并损害本金。随着参与者变得任意的耐心，委托人从观察到的信号中得不到有用的信息。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211158
Dynamic Amnesty Programs动态赦免计划
Sam Kapon
A regulator faces a stream of agentsengaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnestyprogram, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who reporttheir crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crimecan generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct anoptimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomesincreasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycleresets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle,while agents engaged in low return crime report always.
一个监管者面临着一群从事犯罪的代理人，他们有随机的回报。监管者设计了一个特赦计划，承诺对报告其罪行的罪犯进行惩罚的时间路径。在一个最佳方案中，犯罪收益的时间变化可以产生大赦的时间变化。我构建了一个最佳的时间路径，并表明它表现出特赦周期。赦免随着时间的推移变得越来越慷慨，直到它达到一个界限，之后赦免周期就会重置。从事高回报犯罪的代理人在每个周期结束时报告，而从事低回报犯罪的代理人总是会选择报告。
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428
gzh：理想主义的百年孤独
京公网安备 11010802022788号
