MIT契约经济学（英文影印版）

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关键词：契约经济学 经济学 MIT 影印版 英文 经济学 MIT 影印 契约

希望楼主大致给介绍一下，以便大家能够有所了解，随后在决定是否下载！

Foreword to the Second Edition ix
Foreword to the First Edition xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Great Families of Models 3
1.2 The Principal-Agent Model 5
1.3 Overview of the Book 6
References 8
2 Adverse Selection: General Theory 11
*2.1 Mechanism Design 13
2.2.2 General Mechanisms 15
2.2.2 Application to Adverse Selection Models 16
2.2 A Discrete Model of Price Discrimination 18
2.2.2 The Consumer 19
2.2.2 The Seller 19
2.2.3 The First-Best: Perfect Discrimination 20
2.2.4 Imperfect Information 21
2.3 The Standard Model 27
2.3.2 Analysis of the Incentive Constraints 29
2.3.2 Solving the Model 33
Exercises 40
References 42
3 Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions 43
3.1 Examples of Applications 43
3.2.2 Regulating a Firm 43
3.2.2 Optimal Taxation 47

3.1.3 The Insurer as a Monopolist 51
3.2 Extensions 57
3.2J Per/ec/ Competition in Contracts 5/
*3.2.2 Multiple Principals 61
3.2.3 The Theory of Auctions 65
3.2.4 Collusion 73
3.2.5 R/sMwrsMs<?nfc 76
*3.2.6 Multidimensional Characteristics 78
3.2.7 Bilateral Private Information 82
3.2.8 Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities
3.2.9 Auditing the Agent 89
Exercises 91
References 93
4 Signaling Models 97
4.1 The Market for Secondhand Cars 98
4.2 Costly Signals 99
4.2.1 Separating Equilibria 102
4.2.2 Pooling Equilibria 103
4.2.3 The Selection of an Equilibrium 103
4.3 Costless Signals 107
4.3.1 A Simple Example 108
4.3.2 The General Model 109
4.4 Other Examples 114
4.5 The Informed Principal 116
Exercises 117
References 118
5 Moral Hazard 119
5.1 A Simple Example 122
5.2 The Standard Model 124
5.2.1 The Agent's Program 125
5.2.2 The Principal's Program 126
52.3 Properties of the Optimal Contract 129
5.3 Extensions 134
5.U Informativeness and Second-Best Loss
o.s.l A Continuum of Actions 135
5.3.3 The Limited Liability Model 136

*5.3.4 An Infinity of Outcomes 138
5.3.5 The Multisignal Case 139
5.3.6 Imperfect Performance Measurement 140
5.3.7 Models with Several Agents 140
5.3.8 Models with Several Principals 142
*5.3.9 The Robustness of Contracts 144
5.3.10 The Multitask Model 146
5.4 Examples of Applications 149
5.4.2 Insurance 149
5.4.2 Wage Determination 151
Exercises 156
References 159
6 The Dynamics of Complete Contracts 161
6.1 Commitment and Renegotiation 162
6.2 Strategic Commitment 164
6.3 Adverse Selection 168
6.3.1 Full Commitment 170
6.3.2 Long-Term Commitment 172
6.3.3 No Commitment 176
6.3.4 Short-Term Commitment 177
6.3.5 Conclusion 178
6.4 Moral Hazard 179
6.4.1 Renegotiation after Effort 179
*6.4.2 Convergence to the First-Best 181
6.4.3 Finitely Repeated Moral Hazard 183
References 190
7 Incomplete Contracts 193
7.1 Property Rights, Holdup, and Underinvestment
7.1.2 The Buyer-Seller Model 196
7.2.2 The Complete Contract 197
7.2.3 Incomplete Contracts and Property Rights 198
7.2 The Irrelevance Theorems 200
7.2.2 Restoring Efficient Investment Incentives 200
7.2.2 Using Mechanism Design 204
7.3 Concluding Remarks 205
References 209

8 Some Empirical Work 211
8.1 Dealing with Unobserved Heterogeneity 212
8.2 Auctions 216
8.3 Tests of Asymmetric Information
in Insurance Markets 218
References 221
Appendix: Some Noncooperative Game Theory 223
A.l Games of Perfect Information 224
A.l J Nash Equilibrium 224
A.1.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 224
A.2 Games of Incomplete Information 226
A.2.1 Bayesian Equilibrium 226
A.2.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 227
A.2.3 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 229
References 232
Name Index 233
Subject Index 235

楼主能不能把书的作者告诉大家？

I guess this is the book written by Salanie, whom I met once. He is obviously the type of very smart French with rigor training in Maths. I read the first edition two years ago. It was a nice introductory book to the field of contract theory. the part of static contract was well written but the part of dynamic contract was of poor quality. This version adds some empirical stuff and becomes better.

anyway this is in my mind a very nice book to read when you just enter this field. for more advanced readers, i recommend the book contract theory by dewatripont and bolton.

谢谢楼上的指点！谢谢！

这书verycd上有的下的