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READING LIST FOR ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 4/1/02（忘记出处了）
I. GENERAL/BACKGROUND · Greenbaum, S, and Thakor, A., 1995, Contemporary financial intermediation, FortWorth,Dryden Press. · Freixas, X, and Rochet, J.-C., 1997, Microeconomics of banking, MIT Press. · Jaffee, D., and Stiglitz, J., Credit rationing, in B. M. Friedman and F. H. Hahn, eds.),Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. II, North-Holland.
II. ADVERSE SELECTION · Bester, H., Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information,American Economic Review, 75, 4, 850-855.
III. MORAL HAZARD · Bester, H., and Hellwig, M., 1987, Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing. in Bamberg, G., and Spremann, K., (eds.), Agency theory, information and incentives, Heidelberg, Springer Verlag. · Innes, R. D., 1987, Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices, Journal of Economic Theory, 52, 1, 45-67.
IV. CREDIT RATIONING · Stiglitz, J., and Weiss, A., 1981, Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, American Economic Review, 71, 3, 393-410. · Williamson, S., 1987, Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit rationing, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 1, 135-45. · de Meza, D., and Webb, D., 1987, Too much investment: A problem of asymmetric formation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 2, 281-92. · de Meza, D., and Webb, D., 1992, Efficient credit rationing, European Economic Review, 36,6, 1277-90. · Keeton, W., 1979, Equilibrium credit rationing, New York, Garland Press. · Jaffee, D., and Modigliani, F., 1969, A theory and test of credit rationing, American Economic Review, 59, 850-72.
V. OPTIMAL DEBT CONTRACTS (COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION) · Townsend, R., 1979, Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification, Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-93. · Gale, D., and Hellwig., M., 1985, Incentive compatible debt contract: the one-period problem, Review of Economic Studies, LII, 647-63. · Williamson, S., 1987, Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit rationing, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 1, 135-45.
VI. EX ANTE MONITORING/SCREENING · Broecker, T., 1992, Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition, Econometrica, 58, 429-452. · Chan, Y-S., Greenbaum, S. I., and Thakor, A., 1986, Information reusability, competition, and bank asset quality, Journal of Banking and Finance, 10, 243-253. · Hyytinen, A., and Toivanen, O., 1999, Vertical differentiation, Asymmetric information, and endogenous bank screening, mimeo, HKKK.
VII. PROJECT MONITORING/PREVENTING · Diamond, D., 1984, Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, Review of Economic Studies, LI, 393-414. · Sharpe, S., 1990, Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships, Journal of Finance, 45, 4, 1069-87.
VIII. REPUTATION · Diamond, D., 1991, Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank loans and directy placed debt, Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689-721.
IX. DEBT AND EQUITY · Myers, S., and Majluf, N, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221. · Bolton, P., and Freixas, X, 2000, Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Political Economy,108, 2, 324-351
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-3 2:05:58编辑过]
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