第一单元篇目如下:
本帖隐藏的内容
Introduction to agency theoryHolmström, B. (1979), Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1): 74-91.
Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom (1991), Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 7 (Special Issue): 24-52.
Holmström, B. (1982), Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2): 324-340.
Rogerson, W. P. (1992), Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, Review of Economic Studies 59 (4): 777-793.
Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt and J. Tirole (1999), The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures, Review of Economic Studies 66: 183-198.
大家可以自己查找这些论文,也可以直接下载我整理好的压缩包,压缩包售价为2个论坛币。
Lecture 1.rar
(3.21 MB, 需要: 2 个论坛币)



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