诺贝尔经济学奖竞猜

道格拉斯·戴蒙德：在金融机构与监管方面的分析
戈登·塔洛克（Gordon Tullock）：对寻租行为及其意义的探究

安德鲁·施莱弗，拿过1999年的克拉克奖，一般美国克拉克奖得主有很大的概率获诺奖。他主要研究转型经济和行为金融，其理论十分适合于研究最近几年全球的经济状况。

简介：安德鲁·施莱弗是哈佛大学经济学教授，现任美国艺术与科学学院院士、计量经济学会会员。1961年2月20日出生于俄罗斯，后在十几岁的时候移民到美国。麻省理工学院博士，1982年获哈佛大学学士学位。1986年至今，任美国国家经济研究局（NBER）研究员。施莱弗关注俄罗斯的经济改革问题。1991-1997年，施莱弗任俄罗斯ZF顾问，帮助俄罗斯发展金融市场。1992-1994年维什尼任俄罗斯私有化委员会顾问。1999年获美国经济学会克拉克奖。
      安德鲁·施莱弗是行为金融学的杰出代表。1994年，利用金融研究中发现的一些新的投资者行为规律或资产定价规律，共同创立了LSV资产管理公司。2006年初，LSV管理的资产规模已达500亿美元。

研究方向：施莱弗的研究方向是公司财务、资本市场、宏观经济学、转型经济学和俄罗斯经济。作为一个俄裔经济学家，施莱弗更关注俄罗斯的经济改革问题。施莱弗认为，私有化之后的俄罗斯之所以落到权贵资本主义控制国家的地步，根本原因是法治的缺失，因此施莱弗认为，法治是解决俄罗斯经济问题的关键。1999年安德鲁·施莱弗奠定公司金融、金融市场和转型经济学领域的研究范式。

荣誉：1994年，施莱弗获金融定量研究学会授予的玛瑞奖（Roger Murray Prize），1995年获史密斯·伯林顿杰出论文奖（Smith Breeden Award），这是金融领域最负盛名的奖项之一，1999年获美国经济学会约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖章（John Bates Clark Medal），2000年获《金融杂志》（Journal of Finance）授予的关于公司金融和组织的詹森奖（Jensen Prize）。

著作：1998年，安德鲁·施莱弗与合作者罗伯特·维什尼出版的《掠夺之手》，成为研究寻租、腐败和ZF治理研究领域的经典之作。《正在私有化的俄国》《掠夺之手》《没有地图：俄罗斯的政治策略和经济改革》等著作以及多篇学术论文。

我比较看好博弈论界的两位大师，分别是鲁宾斯坦和肯.宾默尔。提起鲁宾斯坦，关注博弈论研究的都不会陌生。这位犹太人在思想性上是具有独创性的。尤其是其鲁宾斯坦在1982年和1985年的两篇文章中所提出的讨价还价模型，被国际经济学界公认为是对纳什（John Nash）讨价还价理论的重大发展。鲁宾斯坦不仅在博弈论和有限理性等传统的经济分析思路上成绩显著，他对于经济学的语言转向问题也很关注。这可以从他的《经济学与语言》中可见分晓。另一位大师就是英国的Ken Binmore，第一次知道他的名字是读他的《博弈论与社会契约》。他也可以算是经济学界的一个奇才。哲学本来是相当枯燥的，也是不容易理解的。可是他偏偏对于哲学有着很深的理解。而且还能把卢梭、康德、罗尔斯、海萨尼等人的思想用数学模型清晰地表现出来。而且他也是一个多产的经济学者，这点与土耳其人Acemoglu有点类似。这两人是本人重点推荐的。

感谢楼主这次活动！！

Douglas W. Diamond　　美国伊利诺州芝加哥市芝加哥大学(University of Chicago, Chicago)商学研究所Merton H. Miller杰出教授

　　获奖成就：对金融中介与监督之分析

　　(英文原文：For his analysis of financial intermediation and monitoring)

　　Anne O. Krueger　　美国华盛顿约翰霍普金斯大学(Johns Hopkins University)Paul H. Nitze高级国际研究学院国际经济学教授

　　Gordon Tullock　　美国维吉尼亚州阿灵顿乔治马森大学法学院(George Mason University School of Law)法律与经济荣誉教授

　　获奖成就：他们对于寻租行为及其意义的阐述

　　(英文原文：For their description of rent-seeking behavior and its implications)

　　Jerry A. Hausman　　美国麻州剑桥麻省理工学院(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)经济学系John and Jennie S. MacDonald教授

　　Halbert L. White, Jr　　美国加州拉荷亚加州大学圣地牙哥分校(University of California San Diego, La Jolla)经济系Chancellor's Associates杰出经济学教授

　　获奖成就：他们对计量经济学的贡献，尤其是郝斯蒙模型设定检定法(Hausman specification test)及White standard errors test

　　(英文原文：For their contributions to econometrics, specifically the Hausman specification test and the White standard errors test)

Claudia Goldin

耶鲁大学金融学教授 Robert Schiller

这可能性比较小吧

没有蒋中一？

Douglas W. Diamond和 Robert J. Shiller
Douglas W. Diamond is the Merton H. Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business. He specializes in the study of financial intermediaries, financial crises, and liquidity. He is a former president of the American Finance Association and the Western Finance Association, a fellow of the Econometric Society, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Finance Association.He is, among others, known for the Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs.
Diamond–Dybvig model
The Diamond–Dybvig model is an influential model of bank runs and related financial crises. The model shows how banks' mix of illiquid assets (such as business or mortgage loans) and liquid liabilities (deposits which may be withdrawn at any time) may give rise to self-fulfilling panics among depositors.
Theory
The model, published in 1983 by Douglas W. Diamond of the University of Chicago and Philip H. Dybvig, then of Yale University and now of Washington University in St. Louis, provides a mathematical statement of the idea that an institution with long-maturity assets and short-maturity liabilities may be unstable.
Structure of the model
Diamond and Dybvig's paper points out that business investment often requires expenditures in the present to obtain returns in the future (for example, spending on machines and buildings now for production in future years). Therefore, when businesses need to borrow to finance their investments, they wish to do so on the understanding that the lender will not demand repayment(s) until some agreed upon time in the future, in other words prefer loans with a long maturity (that is, low liquidity). The same principle applies to individuals seeking financing to purchase large-ticket items such as housing or automobiles. On the other hand, individual savers (both households and firms) may have sudden, unpredictable needs for cash, due to unforeseen expenditures. So they demand liquid accounts which permit them immediate access to their deposits (that is, they value short maturity deposit accounts).
The paper regards banks as intermediaries between savers who prefer to deposit in liquid accounts and borrowers who prefer to take out long-maturity loans. Under ordinary circumstances, banks can provide a valuable service by channeling funds from many individual deposits into loans for borrowers. Individual depositors might not be able to make these loans themselves, since they know they may suddenly need immediate access to their funds, whereas the businesses' investments will only pay off in the future (moreover, by aggregating funds from many different depositors, banks help depositors save on the transactions costs they would have to pay in order to lend directly to businesses). Since banks provide a valuable service to both sides (providing the long-maturity loans businesses want and the liquid accounts depositors want), they can charge a higher interest rate on loans than they pay on deposits and thus profit from the difference.
Diamond and Dybvig's crucial point about how banking works is that under ordinary circumstances, savers' unpredictable needs for cash are unlikely to occur at the same time. Therefore, since depositors' needs reflect their individual circumstances, by accepting deposits from many different sources the bank expects only a small fraction of withdrawals in the short term, even though all depositors have the right to take their deposits back at any time. Thus a bank can make loans over a long horizon, while keeping only relatively small amounts of cash on hand to pay any depositors that wish to make withdrawals. (That is, because individual expenditure needs are largely uncorrelated, by the law of large numbers banks expect few withdrawals on any one day.)
Nash equilibria of the model
However, since banks have no way of knowing whether their depositors really need the money they withdraw, a different outcome is also possible. Since banks lend out at long maturity, they cannot quickly call in their loans. And even if they tried to call in their loans, borrowers would be unable to pay back quickly, since their loans were, by assumption, used to finance long-term investments. Therefore, if all depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously, a bank will run out of money long before it is able to pay all the depositors. The bank will be able to pay the first depositors who demand their money back, but if all others attempt to withdraw too, the bank will go bankrupt and the last depositors will be left with nothing.
This means that even healthy banks are potentially vulnerable to panics, usually called bank runs. If a depositor expects all other depositors to withdraw their funds, then it is irrelevant whether the banks' long term loans are likely to be profitable; the only rational response for the depositor is to rush to take his or her deposits out before the other depositors remove theirs. In other words, the Diamond–Dybvig model views bank runs as a type of self-fulfilling prophecy: each depositor's incentive to withdraw funds depends on what they expect other depositors to do. If enough depositors expect other depositors to withdraw their funds, then they all have an incentive to rush to be the first in line to withdraw their funds.In theoretical terms, the Diamond–Dybvig model provides an example of a game with more than one Nash equilibrium. If depositors expect most other depositors to withdraw only when they have real expenditure needs, then it is rational for all depositors to withdraw only when they have real expenditure needs. But if depositors expect most other depositors to rush quickly to close their accounts, then it is rational for all depositors to rush quickly to close their accounts. Of course, the first equilibrium is better than the second (in the sense of Pareto efficiency). If depositors withdraw only when they have real expenditure needs, they all benefit from holding their savings in a liquid, interest-bearing account. If instead everyone rushes to close their accounts, then they all lose the interest they could have earned, and some of them lose all their savings. Nonetheless, it is not obvious what any one depositor could do to prevent this mutual loss.
Policy implications
In practice, banks faced with bank runs often shut down and refuse to permit more than a few withdrawals, which is called suspension of convertibility. While this may prevent some depositors who have a real need for cash from obtaining access to their money, it also prevents immediate bankruptcy, thus allowing the bank to wait for its loans to be repaid, so that it has enough resources to pay back some or all of its deposits.However, Diamond and Dybvig argue that unless the total amount of real expenditure needs per period is known with certainty, suspension of convertibility cannot be an optimal mechanism for preventing bank runs. Instead, they argue that a better way of preventing bank runs is deposit insurance backed by the government or central bank. Such insurance pays depositors all or part of their losses in the case of a bank run. If depositors know that they will get their money back even in case of a bank run, they have no reason to participate in a bank run.Thus, sufficient deposit insurance can eliminate the possibility of bank runs. In principle, maintaining a deposit insurance program is unlikely to be very costly for the government: as long as bank runs are prevented, deposit insurance will never actually need to be paid out. Bank runs became much rarer in the U.S. after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was founded in the aftermath of the bank panics of the Great Depression. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme is likely to lead to moral hazard: by protecting depositors against bank failure, it makes depositors less careful in choosing where to deposit their money, and thus gives banks less incentive to lend carefully.
"Too big to fail"
Addressing the question of whether too big to fail is a useful focus for bank regulation, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman wrote:My basic view is that banking, left to its own devices, inherently poses risks of destabilizing runs; I’m a Diamond–Dybvig guy. To contain banking crises, the government ends up stepping in to protect bank creditors. This in turn means that you have to regulate banks in normal times, both to reduce the need for rescues and to limit the moral hazard posed by the rescues when they happen.And here’s the key point: it’s not at all clear that the size of individual banks makes much difference to this argument.

Robert J. Shiller
I will introduce him in another post due to the limitation on the forum.

Robert J. Shiller

 Robert James "Bob" Shiller (born Detroit, Michigan, March 29, 1946) is an American economist, academic, and best-selling author. He currently serves as the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University and is a Fellow at the Yale International Center for Finance, Yale School of Management. Shiller has been a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) since 1980, was Vice President of the American Economic Association in 2005, and President of the Eastern Economic Association for 2006-2007. He is also the co-founder and chief economist of the investment management firm MacroMarkets LLC.
Shiller is ranked among the 100 most influential economists of the world.
Shiller received his B.A. from the University of Michigan in 1967, S.M. from MIT in 1968, and his Ph.D. from MIT in 1972.[2] He has taught at Yale since 1982 and previously held faculty positions at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Minnesota, also giving frequent lectures at the London School of Economics. He has written on economic topics that range from behavioral finance to real estate to risk management, and has been co-organizer of NBER workshops on behavioral finance with Richard Thaler since 1991. His book Macro Markets won TIAA-CREF's first annual Paul A. Samuelson Award. He currently publishes a syndicated column.
In 1981 Shiller published an article in the American Economic Review titled "Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends?" He challenged the efficient markets model, which at that time was the dominant view in the economics profession. Shiller argued that in a rational stock market, investors would base stock prices on the expected receipt of future dividends, discounted to a present value. He examined the performance of the U.S. stock market since the 1920s, and considered the kinds of expectations of future dividends and discount rates that could justify the wide range of variation experienced in the stock market. Shiller concluded that the volatility of the stock market was greater than could plausibly be explained by any rational view of the future.
The behavioral finance school gained new credibility following the October 1987 stock market crash. Shiller's work included survey research that asked investors and stock traders what motivated them to make trades; the results further bolstered his hypothesis that these decisions are often driven by emotion instead of rational calculation. Much of this survey data has been gathered continuously since 1989, and is available at Yale's Investor Behavior Project.
In 1991, he formed Case Shiller Weiss with economists Karl Case and Allan Weiss.The company produced a repeat-sales index using home sales prices data from across the nation, studying home pricing trends. The index was developed by Shiller and Case when Case was studying unsustainable house pricing booms in Boston and Shiller was studying the behavioral aspects of economic bubbles.The repeat-sales index developed by Case and Shiller was later acquired and further developed by Fiserv and Standard & Poor, creating the Case-Shiller index.
His book Irrational Exuberance (2000) – a New York Times bestseller – warned that the stock market had become a bubble in March 2000 (the very height of the market top) which could lead to a sharp decline.
On CNBC's "How to Profit from the Real Estate Boom" in 2005, he noted that housing price rises could not outstrip inflation in the long term because, except for land restricted sites, house prices would tend toward building costs plus normal economic profit. Co-panelist David Lereah disagreed. In February, Lereah had put out his book Are You Missing the Real Estate Boom? signaling the market top for housing prices. While Shiller repeated his precise timing again for another market bubble, because the general level of nationwide residential real estate prices do not reveal themselves until after a lag of about one year, people did not believe Shiller had called another top until late 2006 and early 2007.
In the first decade of the 21st century Shiller co-authored a 2003 Brookings paper, "Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?". Shiller subsequently refined his position in the 2nd edition of Irrational Exuberance (2005), acknowledging that “ further rises in the [stock and housing] markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines… A long-run consequence could be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession. This extreme outcome … is not inevitable, but it is a much more serious risk than is widely acknowledged.” Writing in the Wall Street Journal in August 2006, Shiller again warned that "there is significant risk of a very bad period, with slow sales, slim commissions, falling prices, rising default and foreclosures, serious trouble in financial markets, and a possible recession sooner than most of us expected.”[6]
Robert Shiller was awarded the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics in 2009 for his pioneering research in the field of financial economics, relating to the dynamics of asset prices, such as fixed income, equities, and real estate, and their metrics. His work has been influential in the development of the theory as well as its implications for practice and policy-making. His contributions on risk sharing, financial market volatility, bubbles and crises, have received widespread attention among academics, practitioners and policy makers alike.In 2010, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine to its list of top global thinkers.

(irrationalexuberance.com/shiller_downloads/ie_data.xls)
Robert Shiller's plot of the S&P Composite Real Price Index, Earnings, Dividends, and Interest Rates, from Irrational Exuberance, 2d ed.[9] In the preface to this edition, Shiller warns that "[t]he stock market has not come down to historical levels: the price-earnings ratio as I define it in this book is still, at this writing [2005], in the mid-20s, far higher than the historical average. … People still place too much confidence in the markets and have too strong a belief that paying attention to the gyrations in their investments will someday make them rich, and so they do not make conservative preparations for possible bad outcomes."


Price-earnings ratios as a predictor of twenty-year returns based on the plot by Robert Shiller (Figure 10.1,[9] source). The horizontal axis shows the real price-earnings ratio of the S&P Composite Stock Price Index as computed in Irrational Exuberance (inflation adjusted price divided by the prior ten-year mean of inflation-adjusted earnings). The vertical axis shows the geometric average real annual return on investing in the S&P Composite Stock Price Index, reinvesting dividends, and selling twenty years later. Data from different twenty year periods is color-coded as shown in the key. See also ten-year returns. Shiller states that this plot "confirms that long-term investors—investors who commit their money to an investment for ten full years—did do well when prices were low relative to earnings at the beginning of the ten years. Long-term investors would be well advised, individually, to lower their exposure to the stock market when it is high, as it has been recently, and get into the market when it is low."[9]
        ▪        In 2011, he made the Bloomberg 50 most influential people in global finance.[10]
Books
        ▪        Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Princeton University Press (2009), ISBN 978-0-691-14233-6.
        ▪        The Subprime Solution: How Today's Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It by Robert J. Shiller, Princeton University Press (2008), ISBN 0691139296.
        ▪        The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century, by Robert J. Shiller, Princeton University Press (2003), ISBN 0691091722.
        ▪        Irrational Exuberance, by Robert J Shiller, Princeton University Press (2000), ISBN 0691050627.
        ▪        Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society's largest Economic Risks by Robert J. Shiller, Clarendon Press, New York: Oxford University Press (1993), ISBN 0198287828.
        ▪        Market Volatility, by Robert J. Shiller, MIT Press (1990), ISBN 026219290X.


References

1 Grove, Lloyd. "World According to ... Robert Shiller". Portfolio.com. Retrieved 2009-06-26.
2 Blaug, Mark; Vane, Howard R. (2003). Who's who in economics (4 ed.). Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 1840649925.
3 The Closing: Robert Shiller
4 "Economist Rankings at IDEAS". University of Connecticut. Retrieved 2008-09-07.
5 Katie Benner (2009-07-07). "Bob Shiller didn't kill the housing market". CNNMoney.com. Retrieved 2009-07-07.
6 ""No One Saw This Coming": Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models". Munich Personal RePEc Archive. Retrieved 2009-12-16.
7 http://www.ifk-cfs.de/index.php?id=db0
8 "Foreign Policy Magazine"
9  Shiller, Robert (2005). Irrational Exuberance (2d ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-12335-7.
10 http://topics.bloomberg.com/the- ... -in-global-finance/