求助，求助！关于REGULATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

我现在正在修这门课，教授的口音比较重，我不太适应，希望有学过这门课的同学提供一些reference，越详细越好。需要英文的，谢谢！

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：Enterprise Regulation ulation Public ATION 教授 reference PUBLIC

童鞋你好，我现在也修的这门课，总之这门课比较乱，不好掌握，但不是很难，希望我们的OUTLINE能对你有帮助。
Regulation and Public Enterprise (ECO 6142) Page 1 of 4
Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa
Faculté des sciences sociales /Faculty of Social Sciences
Science économique/Economics Department
REGULATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE ECO 6142 PROFESSOR: GAMAL ATALLAH WINTER 2012
Course schedule: Thursday 11:30-2:30
Course location: DMS 11161
Office: DMS 10102
Office hours: Tuesday 11:00-12:00
Telephone: 613-562-5800 (1695)
E-mail: gatallah@uottawa.ca
OFFICIAL COURSE DESCRIPTION
An examination of regulation and public enterprise as alternative approaches for influencing industry conduct and performance.
GENERAL COURSE OBJECTIVES
This course deals with the theoretical aspects of the economics of regulation. It is concerned with how the government can correct market failures, which can be due, among other factors, to entry barriers and externalities. The topics covered include:
-Traditional approaches to regulation, such as cost-based pricing, second-best pricing, peak-load pricing and rate of return regulation;
-Different mechanisms for correcting externalities, taking into account uncertainty and the effects on market structure;
-Price caps and access pricing;
-Regulatory capture, corruption, and trust;
-Regulation under asymmetric information.
EVALUATION
Final exam 50%
Paper 50%
Regulation and Public Enterprise (ECO 6142) Page 2 of 4
MANUALS
The course draws on a large number of journal articles. In addition, excerpts from the following books will be used:
Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J., 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, The MIT Press. (R)
Spulber, D., 1989, Regulation and Markets, The MIT Press. (R)
Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J., 2000, Competition in Telecommunications, The MIT Press. (R)
Kahn, A. E., 1988, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, The MIT Press.
Schmalensee, R., 1988, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. II.
An (R) indicates that the book is available on Reserve at Morisset Library.
The course has a website at https://maestro.uottawa.ca/indexEN.asp.
COURSE OUTLINE
Overview of regulation
Kahn, Alfred E. The Deregulatory Tar Baby: The Precarious Balance Between Regulation and Deregulation, 1970-2000 and Henceforward. Journal of Regulatory Economics. Vol. 21 (1). pp 35-56. January 2002.
Joskow, P. L. (2005). Regulation and deregulation after 25 years: Lessons learned for research in industrial organization. Review of Industrial Organization, 26(2), 169-193.
Parker, D. (2002). Economic regulation: A review of issues. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 73(4), 493-519.
Cost-based pricing
Spulber, Ch. 3.
Second-best pricing
Biggar, D., 2009, ‘Is protecting sunk investments by consumers a key rationale for natural monopoly regulation?’, Review of Network Economics, 8(2), pp. 128-152.
Sheehan, Michael. Why Ramsey Pricing Is Wrong: The Case of Telecommunications Regulation. Journal of Economic Issues. Vol. 25 (1). p 21-32. March 1991.
Contestable markets
Baumol, Panzar and Willig, Ch. 2 (1982) & 17 (1988).
Peak load pricing
Braeutigam, R. R., 1988, Section 5. Peak load pricing, in “Optimal policies for natural monopolies”, in Schmalensee and Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. II, 1988, pp. 1316-20. (R)
Regulation and Public Enterprise (ECO 6142) Page 3 of 4
Rate of return regulation: The Averch-Johnson model
Spulber, Ch. 10, pp. 267-93.
Kahn, 1988, The A-J-W effect, pp. 49-59. (R)
Keeler, James P. Effects of Cost-based Regulation of Prices. International Journal of Transport Economics. Vol. 12 (1). pp. 51-61. February 1985.
Externalities
Spulber, Ch. 12 (pp. 331-45) & Ch. 13 (pp. 350-69).
Puller, S.L., 2006, ‘The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 52, pp. 690-706.
Salanie and Treich, 2009, ‘Regulation in Happyville’, Economic Journal, vol. 119, pp. 665-679.
Heyes, A., 2009, ‘Is environmental regulation bad for competition? A survey’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 36, pp. 1-28.
Porter, M.E., and van der Linde, C., 1995, ‘Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4):97-118.
Price caps
Laffont and Tirole 2000, Ch. 2 & 4.
Access pricing and Telecommunications
Laffont and Tirole 2000, Ch. 2 & 3.
Regulatory capture
Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer, 2008, Regulation and Distrust.
Tullock, G., 1975, ‘The transitional gains trap’, The Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), 671-78.
Becker, 1983, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3):371-400.
Stigler, George J. The Theory of Economic Regulation. 1971. Bell Journal of Economics. 2:3-21.
Introduction to the New Regulatory Economics
Laffont and Tirole 1993, Introduction, pp. 1-19, 35-40.
Laffont and Tirole 1993, Ch. 1, pp. 53-72, 82-84.
Pricing under asymmetric information
Laffont and Tirole 1993, Ch. 2 (pp. 129-37, 155-8) and Ch. 3 (pp. 165-73, 178-9, 206).
Regulation and Public Enterprise (ECO 6142) Page 4 of 4
Absence from an examination or late submission of an assignment
Absence from any examination or test, or late submission of assignments due to illness, must be justified; otherwise, a penalty will be imposed. The Faculty reserves the right to accept or reject the reason offered. Reasons such as travel, employment, and misreading the examination schedule are not usually accepted.
Beware of Academic Fraud! Academic fraud is an act committed by a student to distort the marking of assignments, tests, examinations, and other forms of academic evaluation. Academic fraud is neither accepted nor tolerated by the University. Anyone found guilty of academic fraud is liable to severe academic sanctions.
Here are a few examples of academic fraud:
• engaging in any form of plagiarism or cheating;
• presenting falsified research data;
• handing in an assignment that was not authored, in whole or in part, by the student;
• submitting the same assignment in more than one course, without the written consent of the professors concerned.
In recent years, the development of the Internet has made it much easier to identify academic plagiarism. The tools available to your professors allow them to trace the exact origin of a text on the Web, using just a few words.
In cases where students are unsure whether they are at fault, it is their responsibility to consult the University’s Web site at the following address: http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/eng/writing_tools.asp « Tools for Writing Papers and Assignments ».
Persons who have committed or attempted to commit (or have been accomplices to) academic fraud will be penalized. Here are some examples of the academic sanctions, which can be imposed:
• a grade of « F » for the assignment or course in question;
• an additional program requirement of between 3 and 30 credits;
• suspension or expulsion from the Faculty.
Last session, most of the students found guilty of fraud were given an « F » for the course and had between three and twelve credits added to their program requirement.
For more information, refer to:
http://web5.uottawa.ca/mcs-smc/a ... -students-guide.pdf

非常好！谢谢分享！！