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lThis paper examines the effects of executive compensation and potential for earnings management on the incidence of shareholder class action lawsuits and their outcomes. Although damage measurement factors, managerial option intensity, and
earnings management all significantly affect the probability of lawsuits, they differ in their influence on the likelihood of positive settlement and on settlement amount: Damage factors do not affect the likelihood of settlement versus dismissal. High option intensity raises the probability of positive settlement, but does not affect its amount. High earnings management, on the other hand, does not affect the likelihood of settlement, but does increase settlement amount. These findings suggest that factors typically used to explain shareholder lawsuits should be interpreted with care.

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关键词：财务管理 求帮助 Compensation Probability shareholder management incidence executive potential positive

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本文探讨了高管薪酬和盈余管理的影响股东级诉讼的发生率和他们的结果的影响。虽然损害的测量因素，管理选项的强度，和盈余管理对诉讼概率有显著的影响，其对积极解决的可能性和对结算金额的影响不同：损害因素不影响结算与解雇的可能性。高期权的强度提高了正沉降的概率，但不影响其数量。高收益管理，另一方面，不影响结算的可能性，但确实增加结算金额。这些研究结果表明，通常用来解释股东诉讼的因素应该被解释为照顾。