发帖
雷达卡
1. Cooperation, Trust, and Economic Development: An Experimental
Study in China
Junyi Shen; Xiangdong Qin
2. Violation of environmental regulations in Sweden: Economic
motives, environmental attitudes, and social capital
Holstein, Fredrik; Gren, Ing-Marie
3. Sharing One's Fortune? An Experimental Study on Earned Income
and Giving
Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael
4. Social Information and Charitable Giving: An artefactual
field experiment with young children and adolescents
Guzm?n, Andrea; Villegas-Palacio, Clara; Wollbrant, Conny
5. Social activity and collective action for agricultural
innovation: a case study of New Rural Reconstruction in China
Mary-Fran?oise Renard; Huanxiu GUO
6. Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages
Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; Saglam, Ismail
7. Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas
Grossman, Zachary; van der Weele, Jo??l
8. Time to abandon group thinking in economics
Da Silva, Sergio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Cooperation, Trust, and Economic Development: An Experimental
Study in China
Junyi Shen (Research Institute for Economics & Business
Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan)
Xiangdong Qin (School of Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, China)
Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation
and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise
relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e., whether trust
leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains
unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development
affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination
of public goods experiment, gambling game experiment, and trust
game experiment, we investigate the links among cooperation,
trust, and economic development in four regions of China. Our
results suggest that first, there is a U-shaped or V-shaped
relationship between cooperation and economic development; second,
on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other
hand, more cooperative behavior may be created by rewarding
trusting behavior; and third, men are more cooperative and
trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used
'GSS trust' question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does
not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions
'GSS fair' and 'GSS help' have weak predictive power for trusting
behavior but not for cooperative behavior.
Keywords: Cooperation, Trust, Economic development, Experiment,
China
JEL: C91
Date: 2013-04
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2013-13&r=soc
2. Violation of environmental regulations in Sweden: Economic
motives, environmental attitudes, and social capital
Holstein, Fredrik (Department of Economics, Swedish
University of Agricultural Sciences)
Gren, Ing-Marie (Department of Economics, Swedish University
of Agricultural Sciences)
This paper tests the explanatory power of traditional
enforcement instruments, environmental attitudes and abundance of
social capital for violation of environmental regulations in
Sweden. A count data model is used on a panel data set obtained
from a survey to inspectors at the local and regional
jurisdictions in Sweden. Regressions analyses are carried out for
all firms but also for different firm categories depending on
environmental impacts. The results indicate that traditional
enforcement weapons, measured as number of inspection and a
formal inspection style, curb violation by all types of firm
categories. On the other hand, significant results are that
environmental attitudes and abundance of social capital deter
violation by large firms, but have no impact on violation by
firms with minor environmental impacts.
Keywords: environmental regulations; violation; economic motives;
environmental attitudes; social capital; heterogeneous
firms; count data model; Sweden
JEL: K33
Date: 2013-03-27
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:slueko:2013_003&r=soc
3. Sharing One's Fortune? An Experimental Study on Earned Income
and Giving
Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton)
Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton)
In this paper we investigate the relationship between earnings
and charitable giving. We set up a real effort experiment, in
which subjects enter data in four one-hour occasions and are paid
a piece rate. From the second occasion onwards, we randomly
assign half of the subjects to a treatment with higher piece
rates. At the end we ask subjects whether they want to donate a
share of their earnings to a charity of their choice. We find
that, despite large differences in earnings due to the different
piece rates, subjects receiving the higher piece rate are
actually less likely to give, and that givers in the two groups
give the same share of their total earnings. Charities receive
the same average donation from members of the two groups
indicating that subjects in this experiment do not treat
charitable giving as a normal good.
Keywords: charity, earnings, luck, effort, windfall
JEL: D64
Date: 2013-03
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7294&r=soc
4. Social Information and Charitable Giving: An artefactual
field experiment with young children and adolescents
Guzm?n, Andrea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia-Sede
Medellin)
Villegas-Palacio, Clara (Universidad Nacional de Colombia-
Sede Medellin)
Wollbrant, Conny (Department of Economics, School of
Business, Economics and Law, G?teborg University)
A growing literature in economics examines the development of
preferences among children and adolescents. This paper combines a
repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides
participants with information about the average behavior of
others or not. Collecting data on 384 children aged 5-17, we find
that sensitivity to social information is present already in
early life and that information about others? donations can
reduce, but primarily increases donations.<p>
Keywords: Children; Charitable giving; Social information;
Preference development
JEL: C93
Date: 2013-03-27
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0564&r=soc
5. Social activity and collective action for agricultural
innovation: a case study of New Rural Reconstruction in China
Mary-Fran?oise Renard (CERDI - Centre d'?tudes et de
recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS :
UMR6587 - Universit? d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)
Huanxiu GUO (CERDI - Centre d'?tudes et de recherches sur le
developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Universit?
d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)
Since 2003, a grass-roots movement of New Rural Reconstruction (
NRR) has emerged in China to experience alternative model of
rural development. The movement adopts a particular approach for
rural development on basis of rural social and cultural
reconstruction. In order to understand this social approach, we
investigate an original NRR experiment in a poor village of south
China, where organic farming is promoted by means of basketball
game. An in-depth household survey is conducted to qualitatively
analyze this social approach and derive intuitive hypothesis of
extended social network for empirical test. With a panel
structure dataset collected by the survey, we quantitatively
identify the causal effect of social network by exploiting the
endogeneity of social network formation. Our identification
result provides micro evidence for a large social multiplier
effect in the diffusion of organic farming, whereas it is
negative for organic experts. Also, our results highlight the
role of women, education and labor force for the development of
organic farming. On basis of these results, we conclude that
organic farming is suitable but challenging for small villages in
China, while social activity is a good lever to achieve farmers'
collective action for its large diffusion.
Keywords: New rural reconstruction; Social network; Organic
farming; China. D71;O33;Q55
Date: 2013-03-19
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00802119&r=soc
6. Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages
Gurdal, Mehmet Y.
Ozdogan, Ayca
Saglam, Ismail
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and
excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with
an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this
setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the
behavior of the players both theoretically and experimentally. We
examine games where senders are assumed to communicate with the
receiver either simultaneously or sequentially as well as a game
where the receiver chooses one of these two communication methods.
The theoretical predictions for truth-telling, non-conflicting
messages observed and trust frequencies are the same for both the
simultaneous and sequential plays; however, we observe systematic
differences between the treatments of these plays. While the
truth-telling frequencies stay above the theoretical prediction
of the one half during all the experiments, the nature of truth-
telling seems to differ between sequential and simultaneous plays.
Under simultaneous communication, the messages of senders are
non-conflictive more than half of the time, while the non-
conflicting messages are significantly more likely to be correct
than not. The frequency of non-conflicting messages is lower
under sequential plays due to the tendency of the second sender
to revert the message of the first sender. We observe that
subjects who prefer to get non-conflicting messages prefer
simultaneous mode of communication more often. When acting as
senders, these subjects also adjust their truth-telling
frequencies so as to generate conflictive messages.
Keywords: Strategic information transmission; truth-telling;
trust; sender-receiver game.
JEL: C72
Date: 2013-04-01
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:45727&r=soc
7. Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas
Grossman, Zachary
van der Weele, Jo??l
Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-
interested decisions, orstrategic ignorance, is an important
source of corruption, anti-social behavior and even atrocities.
We model an agent who cares about self-image and has the
opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly
action. The trade-off between self-image concerns and material
payoffs can lead the agent to use ignorance as an excuse, even if
it is deliberately chosen. Two experiments, modeled after Dana,
Weber, and Kuang (2007), show that a) many people will reveal
relevant information about others' payoffs after making an
ethical decision, but not before, and b) some people are willing
to pay for ignorance. These results corroborate the idea that
Bayesian self-signaling drives people to avoid inconvenient facts
in moral decisions.
Keywords: Economics, Economics, General, prosocial behavior,
dictator games, strategic ignorance, self-signaling
Date: 2013-03-15
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt0bp6z29t&r=soc
8. Time to abandon group thinking in economics
Da Silva, Sergio
Group thinking is the notion that animals do those things that
maximize the chance of survival of their species. It is wrong
because natural selection does not favor what is good for the
group or the species; it favors what is good for the individual.
Here, I show through examples how group thinking also pervades
economics. In connection with the fallacy of group thinking, I
also discuss how economics fails to ground itself in the
underlying knowledge provided by biology. I also argue that
economists need to redirect their conventional approach to study
group behavior. Current macroeconomics is reductionist while the
route followed by biology, physics, and chemistry was to resort
to a different approach when focusing on macro systems made up of
a large number of heterogeneous micro units. The group level
pattern self-organizes as it is not encoded directly in the
individual-level rules. And here the right mathematical models
can help deduce hidden connections between the interactions of
individuals and the patterns that emerge at the group level.
Keywords: group thinking, biology, economics
JEL: B41
Date: 2013
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:45660&r=soc
This nep?soc issue is ?2013 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as
is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely
redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed
in part, it must include this copyright notice. It may not be
sold, or placed in something else for sale.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http:
//nep.repec.org/. For comments please write to the director of
NEP, Marco Novarese at < director @ nep point repec point org >.
京公网安备 11010802022788号
