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Elgar Companion to Public Economics: Empirical Public Economics (Elgar Original Reference) (Hardcover)
by Attiat F. Ott (Editor), Richard J. Cebula (Editor) 
Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.
This major new Companion addresses a wealth of topics common to the study of both public economics and public choice including questions such as: How does one structure the whole spectrum of public finance in a manageable framework? What is Wagner’s Law really about and what does empirical testing tell us? How binding is the budget constraint? How encompassing is a dictator’s interest? How do veto powers of the executive, institutional structures and regimes affect public sector outcomes? Do voters behave rationally? Do conflicts yield benefits? Is war cost effective and does secession offer a viable exit option?
The contributions, both theoretical and empirical, shed light on some contentious issues in the public economics literature and provide readers with insight into issues that are at the forefront of discussions about the public economy. The empirical analysis utilizes recent econometric techniques to validate or refute empirical findings based on older ‘vintage’ econometrics. The diversity of coverage ranges from traditional models of the public economy to the incorporation of defence spending as a significant and often neglected function of the public sector. The contributors include many pioneers and leading lights in the field.
The Elgar Companion to Public Economics will be required reading for academics and scholars at many levels in the fields of public economics and public choice but mainly graduate and above. The Companion will also be of value to scholars in the wider social sciences in general and political science in particular.
About the Author
Edited by Attiat F. Ott, Professor of Economics and President, Institute for Economic Policy Studies, Clark University and Richard J. Cebula, Shirley and Philip Solomons Eminent Scholar, Armstrong Atlantic State University
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Contents
PART I THE PUBLIC ECONOMY
1 Public finance and the three branch model 3
Richard A. Musgrave
2 The empirics of the three branch model 9
Attiat F. Ott
3 Wagner’s Law of increasing expansion of public activities 25
Alan Peacock
4 Wagner’s hypothesis: new evidence from the US using the
bounds testing approach 30
James E. Payne, Bradley T. Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi
5 Soft budget constraint and hard budget constraint: who is bailing
out whom and why? 41
Attiat F. Ott and Nirupama Devaraj
6 Public good provision by dictatorships: a survey 70
Robert T. Deacon and Sarani Saha
7 Empirical evidence on the optimality and productivity of
government services in sub-Saharan Africa 95
Rita Babihuga
PART II PUBLIC SECTOR PROVISION
8 The supply side of democratic government: a brief survey 115
Thomas Borcherding and Dong (Dan) Lee
9 Strategic interaction among local governments: a spatial analysis
of spillover of public goods 131
Soma Ghosh
10 Economics of conflict 146
Keith Hartley
11 Defense expenditure and economic growth: evidence from crosscountry
panel data 166
Rati Ram
12 The demand for military spending in Middle Eastern countries
and Turkey 195
Julide Yildirim, Selami Sezgin and Nadir Öcal
PART III RE-SHAPING PUBLIC SECTOR OUTCOMES IN A
DEMOCRACY
13 Fiscal policy and direct democracy: institutional design
determines outcomes 215
Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner
14 Direct democracy and the Tiebout exit 242
Nirupama Devaraj
15 An extension of the rational voter model 263
Richard J. Cebula and Gordon Tullock
16 A preliminary analysis of the Presidential approval rating 274
Richard J. Cebula
17 Line item veto: lessons from the literature 282
David Schap
18 An analysis of the UN Security Council veto 294
Nevila Kote
PART IV MODELS OF PUBLIC SECTOR BEHAVIOR
19 The political theories of deficits and debt accumulation 325
Vladislav Dolgopolov, Bonnie Orcutt and Attiat F. Ott
20 The efficiency of representative democracy: a comparative study
of two competing models 343
Trufat Woldesenbet
21 What kept the Russian Federation intact? Testing the internal exit
model of Buchanan and Faith 364
Vjacheslav Dombrovsky
22 Secession and exit: an analysis of two competing hypotheses 388
Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones
References 402
Index 443
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