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雷达卡
<P></P>by Masahiko Aoki
<P></P>Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 2001.
<P></P>&nbsp;
<P></P>Contents
<P></P>&nbsp;
<P></P>Acknowledgments ix
<P></P>1 What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? 1
<P></P>1.1 Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective 4
<P></P>1.2 Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game 10
<P></P>1.3 Organization of the Book 21
<P></P>I PROTO-INSTITUTIONS: INTRODUCING BASIC TYPES 31
<P></P>2 Customary Property Rights and Community Norms 35
<P></P>2.1 Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System 35
<P></P>2.2 Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem 43
<P></P>Appendix: History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea 55
<P></P>3 The Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets 59
<P></P>3.1 Traders’ Norms 62
<P></P>3.2 Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts 68
<P></P>3.3 Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant 73
<P></P>3.4 Moral Codes 76
<P></P>3.5 Overall Market Governance Arrangements 78
<P></P>Appendix: Money as an Evolutive Convention 91
<P></P>4 Organizational Architecture and Governance 95
<P></P>4.1 Organizational Building Blocks: Hierarchical Decomposition, Information Assimilation, and Encapsulation 98
<P></P>4.2 Types of Organizational Architecture 106
<P></P>4.3 Governance of Organizational Architecture: A Preliminary Discussion 118
<P></P>5 The Co-evolution of Organizational Conventions and Human Asset Types 129
<P></P>5.1 Types of Mental Programs: Individuated versus Context-Oriented Human Assets 131
<P></P>5.2 The Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizational Conventions 135
<P></P>5.3 The Interactions of Organizational Fields and Gains from Diversity 140
<P></P>5.4 The Relevance and Limits of the Evolutionary Game Model 147
<P></P>6 States as Stable Equilibria in the Polity Domain 151
<P></P>6.1 Three Prototypes of the State 153
<P></P>6.2 Various Forms of the Democratic and Collusive States 160
<P></P>II A GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 181
<P></P>7 A Game-Theoretic Concept of Institutions 185
<P></P>7.1 Exogenous Rules of the Game and Endogenous Action-Choice Rules 186
<P></P>7.2 The Institution as a Summary Representation of an Equilibrium Path 197
<P></P>7.3 Feedback Loops of Institutionalization 202
<P></P>8 The Synchronic Structure of Institutional Linkage 207
<P></P>8.1 Social Embeddedness 208
<P></P>8.2 Linked Games and Institutionalized Linkages 213
<P></P>8.3 Institutional Complementarity 225
<P></P>9 Subjective Game Models and the Mechanism of Institutional Change 231
<P></P>9.1 Why Are Overall Institutional Arrangements Enduring? 233
<P></P>9.2 Subjective Game Models and General Cognitive Equilibrium 235
<P></P>9.3 The Mechanism of Institutional Change: The Cognitive Aspect 239
<P></P>10 Diachronic Linkages of Institutions 245
<P></P>10.1 Overlapping Social Embeddedness 247
<P></P>10.2 The Reconfiguration of Bundling 260
<P></P>10.3 Diachronic Institutional Complementarity 267
<P></P>III AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 275
<P></P>11 Comparative Corporate Governance 279
<P></P>11.1 Governance of the Functional Hierarchy 282
<P></P>11.2 Codetermination in the Participatory Hierarchy 287
<P></P>11.3 Relational-Contingent Governance of the Horizontal Hierarchy 291
<P></P>12 Types of Relational Financing and the Value of Tacit Knowledge 307
<P></P>12.1 A Generic Definition of Relational Financing and Its Knowledge-Based Taxonomy 310
<P></P>12.2 The Institutional Viability of Relational Financing 314
<P></P>13 Institutional Complementarities, Co-emergence, and Crisis: The Case of the Japanese Main Bank System 329
<P></P>13.1 The Main Bank Institution as a System of Shared Beliefs 331
<P></P>13.2 Institutional Emergence: Unintended Fits 333
<P></P>13.3 Endogenous Inertia, Misfits with Changing Environments, and a Crisis of Shared Beliefs 340
<P></P>14 Institutional Innovation of the Silicon Valley Model in the Product System Development 347
<P></P>14.1 Information-Systemic Architecture of the Silicon Valley Model 349
<P></P>14.2 The VC Governance of Innovation by Tournament 360
<P></P>14.3 Norms and Values in the Silicon Valley Model 366
<P></P>Appendix: The Stylized Factual Background for Modeling 371
<P></P>15 Epilogue: Why Does Institutional Diversity Continue to Evolve? 377
<P></P>15.1 Some Stylized Models of Overall Institutional Arrangements 377
<P></P>15.2 Self-organizing Diversity in the Global Institutional Arrangement 386
<P></P>Notes 395
<P></P>References 433
<P></P>Index 457
<P></P>
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