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英文文献：Identifying hypothetical bias in experimental auctions in field settings in developing countries-确定发展中国家实地实验拍卖中的假设偏差
英文文献作者：Oparinde, Adewale,Banerji, Abhijit,Birol, Ekin,Perez, Salomon
英文文献摘要：
Experimental auctions conducted in the field lose some controls of laboratory experiments as a tradeoff for market realities, which could distort their demand revealing properties both in theory and practice. Ethical reasons have been widely cited for not asking the poor to pay out of pocket in experimental auctions conducted in field settings in developing countries and the allocation of participatory fees is thus common. This endowment creates distortions in an optimal bidding behavior, though evidence is mixed. In this paper, we investigated whether consumers in developing countries will be willing to pay out of pocket when the unit sale price of the auctioned good is an insignificant share of the household food budget. Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism was used to collect auction data for biofortified crops in Nigeria, Rwanda, India and Guatemala. We show that an out of pocket payment experimental setting is an alternative practical approach of identifying hypothetical bias in auction bids elicited in the field which could be masked by the windfall income effect created by the participatory fees. This approach shows that auction bids could be inflated by 7 to 24 percent due to hypothetical bias as a result of participants’ ex ante nonpayment decisions. Nonpayment is higher in African countries than in non-African countries, which is a reflection of the underlining heterogeneity in economic background. Conducting experimental auctions in an out-of-pocket payment context can assist in mimicking market realities as close as possible in the field setting in developing countries.
作为对市场现实的权衡，实地进行的实验拍卖失去了对实验室实验的一些控制，这可能会扭曲其需求，在理论和实践中都揭示出特性。在发展中国家实地进行的试验性拍卖中，人们广泛引用了不要求穷人掏腰包的道德理由，因此分担费用的分配很普遍。这种捐赠造成了对最优出价行为的扭曲，尽管证据是混合的。在这篇论文中，我们调查了发展中国家的消费者是否愿意在拍卖商品的单位售价在家庭食品预算中所占比例很小的时候掏腰包。利用Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)机制收集尼日利亚、卢旺达、印度和危地马拉的生物强化作物的拍卖数据。我们表明，一个自付的实验设置是一种替代的实际方法，以确定在领域引起的假设偏差拍卖出价可能被掩盖的意外收入效应由参与费。这种方法表明，由于参与者事先的拒付决定所造成的假设偏差，拍卖出价可能会被夸大7%到24%。非洲国家的拒付率高于非非洲国家，反映了经济背景的异质性日益突出。在自费支付的情况下进行实验性拍卖，有助于在发展中国家实地环境中尽可能地模拟市场现实。
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