1. Political Economy and the Role of Government
1.1 Explaining the Scope and Growth of Government:
Aghion, P., A. Alesina, and F. Trebbi. "Endogenous Political Institutions." NBER Working Paper 9006, June 2002.
Ansolabehere, S., J. de Figueiredo, and J. Snyder. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?" Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcoming).
Borcherding, T. "The Causes of Government Expenditure Growth: A Survey of the U.S. Evidence." Journal of Public Economics 28 (1985): 359-382.
Holsey, A., and T. Borcherding. "Why Does Government's Share of National Income Grow? An Assessment of the Recent Literature." In Perspectives on Public Choice. Edited by D. Mueller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Peltzman, S. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives." Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992): 327-362.
Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000): 1121-1161.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. "Political Economics and Public Finance." In Handbook of Public Economics. Vol. 3. Edited by A. Auerbach, and M. Feldstein. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2001, pp. 1549-1660.
Shepsle, K., and B. Weingast. "Political Solutions to Market Problems." American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 417-434.
1.2 Voting Models and Public Choice:
Laffont, J. Chapters 4, 5 in Lectures in Public Economics.
Lizzeri, A., and N. Persico. "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives." American Economic Review 91 (March 2001): 225-239.
Tideman, N., and G. Tullock. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices." Journal of Political Economy 84 (1976): 1145-1159.
1.3 Bureaucrats, Elected Officials, and Public Choice:
Alesina, A., and D. Rodrik. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (May 1994): 465-490.
Auerbach, A. "Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Controls." Mimeo, University of California - Berkeley, July 2003.
Banerjee, A. "A Theory of Misgovernance." Quarterly Journal of Eocnomics 112 (November 1997): 1289-1332.
Besley, T., and A. Case. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Empirical Evidence from the United States." Journal of Economic Literature 41 (March 2003): 7-73.
Fiorina, M., and R. Noll. "Voters, Bureaucrats, and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy." Journal of Public Economics 9 (1978): 239-55.
Niskanen, W. "Bureaucrats and Politicians." Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975): 617-643.
Poterba, J. "State Reactions to Fiscal Crises: 'Natural Experiments' for Studying the Effects of Budgetary Institutions." Journal of Political Economy 102 (August 1994): 799-821.
Romer, T., and H. Rosenthal. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy." Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (1979): 563-588.
———. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda." Economic Inquiry (1982): 556-578.
Roubini, N., and J. Sachs. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in Industrial Democracies." European Economic Review 33 (1989): 903-933.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. "Corruption." Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (August 1993): 599-618.