读点公司金融的论文

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自觉论文读得太少，没人讨论，于是开个帖子，聊聊读的公司金融方面的论文。

第一篇：

Ferri, Fabrizio, and Nan Li, 2016, The Effect ofOption-Based Compensation on Payout Policy: Evidence from FAS123R, SSRNElectronic Journal.

下载地址：https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2879218

文章运用了一个外生性冲击：

To address these problems we utilizethe 2005 adoption of Financial Accounting Standard 123R (hereinafter FAS123R)as an exogenous shock to the use of option compensation. Previously, firms were required to expense ESO’sintrinsic value at the grant date while disclosing the fair value amount infootnotes (this amount is referred to as ‘implied option expense’). As most ESOwere granted at the money and, thus, with zero intrinsic value, firms reportedno expense in their income statements. FAS123R required firms to expense ESO inthe income statement at fair value.

简言之，在这项规定之前，公司在income statement上面报的期权报酬的费用大都为零，规定之后，报的期权的费用大幅上升，导致期权报酬大幅下降。

作者引用大量文献以说明现有文献的观点是：As the managers’ option compensationincreases, managers prefer to replace dividends with repurchase becausedividend decreases the value of the executive options. The question is that whetherthe prior conclusion still holds after taking into account the endogeneityproblem.

The mainregression is reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is dividend/asset. Theregressor of interest is post*treat where treat=0 if the firms granted no CEOstock options or began expensing the options at the fair values before theregulation. The main result is that post*treat is insignificant, showing CEOstock option may not have a big impact on the dividend policy. Similarly, theresult is insignificant for repurchase. They seem to prefer first order differenceregression instead of the one using post*treat.

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关键词：公司金融 Compensation significant Endogeneity repurchase 下载地址 problems Journal address option

第二篇：
Chu (2016)

Chu, Yongqiang, 2016, Shareholder-Creditor Conflict andPayout Policy, SSRN Electronic Journal.

Main story:

·        When lenders and shareholders merge, the agencyconflict is resolved, leading to lower payout.

·        The background of the paper is that mangers canfavor shareholders by paying out excessive dividends. The most telling exampleis the quote.

·        Black (1976) points out that “there is no easierway for a company to escape the burden of a debt than to pay out all of itsassets in the form of a dividend, and leave the creditors holding an emptyshell”.

His main table:

谢谢分享

晓七 发表于 2016-12-24 02:50
谢谢分享

谢谢评分和回复。

                        Paper 3: Farre-Mensa, Michaely,and Schmalz (2014)Farre-Mensa, Joan, Roni Michaely, and MartinC. Schmalz, 2014, Financing Payouts, SSRN ElectronicJournal.
Firms finance their payouts through debt.Without external debt, firms cannot afford payouts. The motivationsinclude repatriation tax and monitoring that comes with the debt. Ilike their use of the state tax change as an exogenous shock. Astaxes increase, firms are more likely pay out dividends and issuemore debt.


Paper 4: Jagannathan, Stephens,and Weisbach (2000)Jagannathan, Murali, Clifford P Stephens, andMichael S Weisbach, 2000, Financial flexibility and the choicebetween dividends and stock repurchases, Journal of FinancialEconomics 57, 355–384.
Main story. This is an old but influentialpaper. Basically they establish the now well-known conclusion thatfirms have more flexibility with repurchase than with dividends. Weknow that dividends are sticky: firms are reluctant to cutdividends whereas there is little commitment to repurchase.
The main result is the following.

Given that operating cash flows arerelatively permanent while non-operating incomes are moretemporary, this finding suggests that dividend increases are fundedout of permanent cash flows. The standard deviation of operatingincome, a proxy for the stability of cash flows, is lower for thedividend-increasing firms than for the firms making no change toexisting (but positive) payouts.
                                                                       

Paper 5: Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005)

Stocks that are short-sell constrained earn abnormally lowreturns. A firm is short sell constrained if it has high short interest (highdemand) and low institutional ownership (low supply). Unfortunately the resultonly holds for EW returns, but not VW returns. The authors also look at theprofitability of different kinds of shorting strategies. Moreover, theyconclude that short sell constraint is not very common among stocks. Theyestimate that only 21 out of more than 5000 stocks are short sell constrainedevery month.

Paper 6: Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016)

Crane, Alan D., Sébastien Michenaud, and James P. Weston,2016, The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence fromIndex Thresholds, Review of Financial Studies 29, 1377–1408.

The higher the institutional ownership, the higher thepayout. The selling point is the regression discontinuity design based on the Russell1000/2000 cutoff. The results are stronger for firms with high agency costs asmeasured by G index, board size and so on.

学习一下

Bushee, Brian J., 2001, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value?, Contemporary Accounting Research 18, 207–246.
Transient institutions prefer firms focusing on the short term values.

Paper 8: Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015)
Fich, Eliezer M., Jarrad Harford, and Anh L. Tran, 2015, Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights, Journal of Financial Economics 118, 21–48.
What matters is not the proportion of institutional ownership, but the number of institutional investors who assign large portfolio weights to the firms in question. Imagine that institutional ownership of a firm A is 100%, but for each institutional investor, the portfolio weight of firm A is close to zero. Then no institutional investor allocates much effort or attention to monitor firm A. By contrast, though the institutional ownership of firm B is 10%, but that 10% is owned by one institutional investor who assigns 100% portfolio weight to firm B. Then the institutional investor will monitor firm B closely. This paper finds that the M&A target premium and completion rates are increasing in the institutional holdings measured by institutional portfolio weights. They resolve the endogeneity problem by the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff.