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51
FM3 发表于 2005-2-22 01:31:00

Claude Ménard, (U. of Paris 1)

http://atom.univ-paris1.fr/content/view/8/51/

Professeur Directeur de Centre ATOM menard@univ-paris1.fr Tel : +33 (0)1 44 07 83 18 Fax : +33 (0)1 44 07 83 20 Télécharger le CV en français/in english.

Centres d'intérêt : Economie des organisations, Economie des institutions, Economie industrielle, Réglementation et contrats.

Documents de recherche récents :

http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/2002.php?req=7

52
FM3 发表于 2005-2-22 01:38:00

Benito Arrunada, (U. of Pompeu Fabra)

http://www.econ.upf.es/~arrunada/eng/

Here you can download my recent publications and teaching materials.

I am interested in the empirical study of organizations and institutions. My recent works focus on two main areas:

Workshop on Institutional Analysis Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Barcelona

http://www.econ.upf.es/~arrunada/workshop.html

(ESNIE 2003 - Tuesday 1st April - Institutions and Cognition)

http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/2003.php?req=25

Tile : "Behavioral assumptions in institutional analysis"

Lecture Outline :

Findings in cognitive sciences demand a reconsideration of the standard assumptions about human behavior, related to rationality and cooperation. This lecture will review some of these findings and will explore their consequences for the analysis of institutions and organizations.

Bibliographical References :

ARRUÑADA, B. (2003), "Institutions from the Perspective of Evolutionary Psychology," Universitat Pompeu Fabra, class notes, January.

Download - 1.01 MB

FEHR, E., and S. GÄCHTER (2000), "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159-81.

Download - 124.29 KB

53
FM3 发表于 2005-2-22 01:47:00

Erin Anderson, (INSEAD)

http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/marketing/anderson/

The John H. Loudon Chaired Professor of International Management Professor of Marketing

http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/2003.php?req=21

Tile : "Contracts and the Organization of Distribution Networks"

Lecture Outline :

  • The nature of distribution networks
  • Vertical integration in distribution
  • Quasi vertical integration
    • Relational Governance
      • Exchanging hostages

Download the presentation - 224.00 KB

Bibliographical References :

Anderson, Erin and Barton Weitz (1992), "The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain Commitment in Distribution Channels," Journal of Marketing Research, 24 (February), 18-34.

This paper is not (yet) available for download

Rindfleisch, Aric and Jan B. Heide (1997), "Transaction Cost Analysis: Present, Past, and Future," Journal of Marketing, 41 (October), 30-54.

This paper is not (yet) available for download


Gary Libecap, (U. of Arizona)

http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/2003.php?req=23

(ESNIE 2003 - Wednesday 2th April - Theories of the Institutional Framework)

Tile : "Transaction Costs and Institutional Responses to the Common Pool"

Lecture Outline :

  1. Most critical environmental and natural resource problems arise from common pool externalities.
  2. Even though there can be consensus on the need to address externalities associated with the common pool, such as the losses of over fishing, the too rapid draw down of aquifers, and the emission of greenhouse gases associated with global warming, actual agreement on an institutional response is complicated by information problems, distributional disagreements, and enforcement. These factors raise the transaction costs of institutional responses to the common pool.
  3. Given these conditions, one cannot understand the process of institutional change without consideration of transaction costs.
  4. In the presence of transaction costs, one must be careful in making strong efficiency claims about observed conditions that appear to be "inefficient."

Download the presentation - 199.95 KB

Bibliographical References :

Libecap G. (2002), "Transaction Costs and Institutional Responses to the Common Pool", Prepared for presentation at the Coase Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 2002.

Download - 212.09 KB

Bial J., Houser D. & G. Libecap (2002), "Public choice issues in international collective action: Global warming regulation".

Download - 73.93 KB

Libecap G. (2003), "Transaction Costs and the Reallocation of Water Rights from Agriculture to Urban and Environmental Uses", working paper, Karl Eller Center, University of Arizona.

Download - 21.29 KB

54
FM3 发表于 2005-2-22 01:51:00

Bentley Mac Leod, (U. of Southern California)

http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~wmacleod/

Professor of Economics and Law

Department of Economics Kaprielian Hall 300 University of Southern California

http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/2003.php?req=22

Tile : "Incomplete Contracting"

Download the presentation - 37.96 KB

Bibliographical References :

Bentley Mac Leod, "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation", August 2002, forthcoming in the American Economic Review, 2003

55
FM3 发表于 2005-2-22 01:56:00

Brian Silverman, (U. of Toronto)

http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~silverman/

http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/2004.php?req=41

(ESNIE 2004 - Monday 3 rd May - Organisations and Property Rights)

Tile : "The New Institutional Economics of Organizational Change"

Download the presentation - 110.00 KB

Bibliographical References :

Haveman, Heather A. (1992). "Between a rock and a hard place: Organizational change and performance under conditions of fundamental environmental transformation." Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 48-75

Download - 3.05 MB

Barnett, William P. and Glenn R. Carroll (1995). "Modeling internal organizational change." Annual Review of Sociology, 21: 217-236

Download - 1.92 MB

Nickerson, Jack A. and Brian S. Silverman (2004). "Why firms want to organize efficiently and what keeps them from doing s Inappopriate governance, performance, and adaptation in a deregulated industry," Administrative Science Quarterly, forthcoming

Download - 314.42 KB

Bigelow, Lyda S. and Nick S. Argyres (2004), "Do transaction costs matter at all stages of the industry lifecycle?, mimeo.

Download - 216.55 KB


56
luo106857 发表于 2005-5-30 12:18:00

大家别忘记,还有

Mit的Acemoglu

Harvard 的Robinson

57
我闻前思 发表于 2005-6-17 23:15:00

钱颖一

推荐一个:钱颖一,伯克利加州大学经济系教授,个人主页可在“中评网”找到。http://www.china-review.com

nie钱颖一伯克利主页:http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~yqian/

[此贴子已经被nie于2005-6-18 9:01:15编辑过]

58
nie 发表于 2005-7-3 16:20:00

ACEMOGLU

DARON ACEMOGLU

现在最当红的制度经济学家和政治经济学家之一,MIT,似乎刚刚得到克拉克奖。

Acemoglu is an extremely broad and productive economist. He has made valuable contributions to several distinct fields, starting with labor economics, and successively moving to macroeconomics, institutional economics, and political economy. His most recent work on the role of institutions in development and in political economy is especially innovative, and has already had a large impact on research in these areas. Although Acemoglu is primarily a theorist, his work is always motivated by real-world questions that arise when facts are difficult to reconcile with existing theory.

We summarize Acemoglu’s work roughly in chronological order.

Labor Economics: Skill Acquisition and Technological Change

Acemoglu in a series of papers explored the question of whether there is underinvestment in general skills, and if so, why. As is typical in Acemoglu’s work, he began by looking carefully at existing models and understanding which assumptions driving the results might not be correct. Acemoglu in his 1997 REStud model departed from the standard assumption of perfect labor markets, and introduced costly search for unemployed workers. In variants of this model, Acemoglu and Pischke in their 1998 QJE and 1999 JPE papers include asymmetric information among employers about workers’ abilities and other distortions that also decrease worker mobility. His 1998 QJE model endogenizes technological change by letting firms choose technologies based on the skill distribution in the available pool of workers. This body of work introduces into labor economics a rich set of models that are more realistic than those they replace and has led to a large body of empirical work.

Macroeconomics: Investment and Growth

Jointly with Zilibotti (JPE 1997), Acemoglu develops the idea that a historical shock that results in a favorable increment to the capital stock may itself stimulate further investment and growth through a risk-diversifying, expected-return-enhancing mechanism.

Macroeconomics: Directed Search and Unemployment

Search models with frictions have long been used to examine employment and unemployment. These models typically can match some of the stylized facts of labor markets, but are wildly off in other dimensions. Acemoglu has developed an original labor market framework that is proving useful to labor economists, particularly those with a macro-orientation (Acemoglu and Shimer, JPE 1999 and REStud 2000). Equilibrium in even the simplest version of the model yields most of the relevant stylized facts. The feature of the model that accounts for its success is the idea of directed search: workers first learn something about different firms’ characteristics and then apply to a small subset of firms. Allowing this sort of directed search expands greatly the model’s ability to fit stylized facts. The model, along with subsequent variants, has led to a wide variety of empirical work.

The Role of Institutions in Economic Development and Political Economy

Acemoglu has several papers that argue that institutions play a more prominent role in development than was generally accepted. His 2002 QJE paper with Johnson and Robinson argues that countries that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor, a point that is inconsistent with the view that geography is destiny. The argument, supported by empirical evidence, is that this is due to colonizing countries treating rich and densely populated countries differently from poor and sparsely populated countries. In the former, they followed policies of extracting wealth and in the latter they followed policies that encouraged investment. Acemoglu’s 2001 AER paper, also with Johnson and Robinson, uses differences in mortality rates faced by Europeans in different countries to study further the degree to which different policies lead to different institutions, which in turn lead to different development paths. Some of the methods and the conclusions of this paper are still being debated, but this line of Acemoglu’s work has already stimulated substantial research that rethinks the development process. In related work on political economy, for example with Robinson in APSR 2001, he has examined the dynamics of political processes and the persistence of inefficient policies. This work has been influential in political science.

CV: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_cv.php?prof_id=acemoglu

Personal web page: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/?prof_id=acemoglu

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