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撒拉捏，契约经济学重要人物

SALANIE Bernard INSEE-CREST Researcher at LEI salanie@ensae.fr

Une version française de cette page est ici

RESEARCH FIELDS

Contract theory; labor economics; theoretical and applied econometrics.

PROFESSIONAL DATA

1986-88 : Research Fellow at INSEE's Research Department 1988-90 : short-term forecasting, Forecasting Department of INSEE. 1990-91 : Visiting Scholar, Stanford University. 1991-92 : professor at ENSAE. 1992-94 : Director of Studies at ENSAE. 1994-95 : Director of ENSAE. 1995-97 : Director of LEI (CREST). 1997-2000 : Head of the Macroeconomic Policy Unit, INSEE. 2000-2001 : Visiting professor, University of Chicago. 2001- 2003: Director of CREST. 2003-: Research Fellow at LEI (CREST).

1994-2004: Associate professor at Ecole Polytechnique.

2004-: Professor at Ecole Polytechnique.

Associate editor of Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (1989-) and of Research in Economics (2000-).

Member of the Editorial Board of the Review of Economic Studies (1999-2003). Managing Editor of the Review of Economic Studies (2003-).

Member of the Programme Committees of the European Meeting of the Econometric Society in 1996 and of the 1999 Meeting of the European Economic Association.

Co-chairman of the Programme Committee of the European Meeting of the Econometric Society in 2003.

Research Fellow of the Center for Economic Policy Research.

Research Fellow of IZA.

Research Fellow of CESifo.

Fellow of the Econometric Society (since 2001).

TEACHING

Microeconomics, macroeconomics, econometrics.

PUBLICATIONS Books: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press, 1997 (translated in Japanese by Keiso Shobo Publishers, 2000). The Microeconomics of Market Failures, MIT Press, 2000 (translated in Chinese by Shanghai University Press, 2004). The Economics of Taxation, MIT Press, 2003.

Articles:

« Estimation of Multimarket Fix-Price Models: an Application of Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Methods », Econometrica (1989), 57, 831-860 (with Guy Laroque). « Long Term, Short Term, and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting », Econometrica (1990), 58, 597-619 (with Patrick Rey). « Sélection adverse et aversion pour le risque », Annales d'économie et de statistique (1990), 18, 131-149. « Wage and Price Adjustment in a Multimarket Disequilibrium Model », Journal of Applied Econometrics (1991), 6, 1-15. « Spéculation, prix et bien-être », Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (1991), 24, 209-246 (with Stéphane Gregoir). « Simulation-based Estimation of Models with Lagged Latent Variables", Journal of Applied Econometrics (1993), 8, S119-S133 (with Guy Laroque), reprinted in Econometric Inference Using Simulation Techniques, H. Van Dijk, A. Monfort et B. Brown eds, John Wiley (1995). « Repeated Moral Hazard: the Role of Memory and Commitment », European Economic Review (1994), 38, 1527-1553 (with Pierre-André Chiappori, Ines Macho and Patrick Rey). « Estimating the Canonical Disequilibrium Model: Asymptotic Theory and Finite Sample Properties », Journal of Econometrics (1994), 62, 165-210 (with Guy Laroque). « Measuring the Incidence of Insider Trading: A Comment on Shin », Economic Journal (1994), 104, 1418-1419 (with Bruno Jullien). « Macroeconometric Disequilibrium Models », in the Handbook of Applied Econometrics: Macroeconomics, H. Pesaran and M. Wickens eds, Basil Blackwell (1995) (with Guy Laroque). « Un modèle de déséquilibre de la courbe de Phillips en France et en Allemagne », Annales d'économie et de statistique (1996), 44, 1-28 (with Guy Laroque). " On the Value of Commitment in Contracting with Asymmetric Information », Econometrica (1996), 64, 1395-1414 (avec Patrick Rey). " Empirical Contract Theory: The Case of Insurance Data ", European Economic Review (1997), 41, 943-950 (with Pierre-André Chiappori). " La réglementation des monopoles naturels ", in A. Perrot ed., Réglementation et concurrence, Economica (with Pierre-Philippe Combes and Bruno Jullien) (1997). " Normal Estimators for Cointegrating Relationships ", Economics Letters (1997), 55, 184-189 (with Guy Laroque). " Le partage des profits agrégés ", Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (1998), 51, 169-185. " Développements récents en économétrie des contrats ", Revue Economique (1999), 50, 611-620. " Early Starters vs Late Beginners " (with Pierre-André Chiappori and Julie Valentin), Journal of Political Economy (1999), 107, 731-760. " Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires ", Economie et Prévision (1999), 137, 119-141. " Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort? " (with Bruno Jullien and François Salanié), Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1999), 24, 19-28. " Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets " (with Pierre-André Chiappori), Journal of Political Economy (2000), 108, 56-78. " Estimating Preferences under Risk: The Case of Racetrack Bettors " (with Bruno Jullien), Journal of Political Economy (2000), 108, 503-530. " Prélèvements et transferts sociaux : une analyse descriptive des effets incitatifs " (with Guy Laroque), Economie et statistique (2000), 328. " Une décomposition du non-emploi en France » (avec Guy Laroque), Economie et statistique (2000), 331. « Une maquette analytique du marché du travail à long terme », Economie et prévision (2000), 146, 1-13. "Labor Market Institutions and Employment in France" (with Guy Laroque), Journal of Applied Econometrics (2002), 17, 25-48. This paper was awarded the Richard Stone Prize in 2004. "Optimal Demogrants with Imperfect tagging", Economics Letters (2002), 75, 319-324. "Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à l'emploi" (with Guy Laroque), Revue Economique (2002), 53, 1127-1147. "Salaire minimum et emploi en présence de négociations salariales" (avec Guy Laroque), CREST DP2002-10, forthcoming in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work" (with Pierre-André Chiappori), in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, vol 1, M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky eds, Cambridge University Press. "Testing Contract Theory", CESifo Economic Studies (2003), 49, 461-477. "Fécondité et offre de travail des femmes" (with Guy Laroque), Economie publique (2003), 13, 61-94. "A Nonparametric Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method » (with Jean-David Fermanian), Econometric Theory (2004), 20, 701-734. « Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications (with Pierre-André Chiappori, Bruno Jullien and François Salanié), forthcoming in the Rand Journal of Economics.

DISCUSSION PAPERS

"Screening Risk-averse Agents under Moral Hazard » (with Bruno Jullien and François Salanié), mimeo.

« Empirical Evidence on the Preferences of Racetrack Bettors”(avec Bruno Jullien), mimeo.

"Fertility and Financial Incentives in France" (with Guy Laroque), CREST WP 2003-32.

http://www.crest.fr/pageperso/lei/salanie/salanie_en.html

西格尔，斯坦福教授，1995年从哈佛毕业，师从史莱佛、哈特和马斯金三个大牛。他的博士论文为不完全契约提供了一种基础。

ILYA R. SEGAL Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Stanford University Landau Economics Building Room 242 579 Serra Mall Stanford, CA 94305-6072

Telephone: 650-724-4905 Fax: 650-725-5702

Email: ilya.segal@stanford.edu

Vitae

Recent Working Papers (in PDF format)

"The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," September 2003, updated April 2004

"The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices," with Noam Nisan, updated February 2004, forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory

"Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication, " with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, December 2003

"Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority," August 1995

霍姆斯特朗，契约理论和组织理论重要人物，MIT教授

Papers

A Theory of Firm Scope Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom November 2002

On Incentives and Control in Organizations-Chapter 1 B. Holmstrom Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford U, 1977

On Incentives and Control in Organizations-Chapter 2

On Incentives and Control in Organizations-Chapter 3

On Incentives and Control in Organizations-Chapter 4

On Incentives and Control in Organizations-Chapter 5 http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/index.htm?prof_id=bengt&type=paper

钱颖一，伯克利加州大学教授。 Yingyi Qian Home Page

Yingyi Qian Professor of Economics

Department of Economics

University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720-3880 U.S.A.

Phone: 1-510-643-0687 Fax: 1-510-642-6615 Email: yqian@econ.berkeley.edu Website: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~yqian

ABOUT ME

TEACHING

RESEARCH

Brief Bio

Economics 162

List of Articles in English

C.V. [PDF]

Economics 260B

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青木昌彦，比较制度分析创始人，斯坦福大学退休教授

MASAHIKO AOKI Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor of Japanese Studies (Emeritus)

Ph.D. University of Minnesota; A.B., M.A. University of Tokyo.

Research Interests: The theory of the firm, Japanese economy, comparative economic institutions.

Current Research: Why do different institutional arrangements develop in different economies and what are their implications?

Representative Recent Publications: (1) Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1988; (2) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, forthcoming from MIT Press; (3) "Information and Governance in the Silicon Valley Model," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003.

Teaching Interests: Modern firm: theory and practice, the Japanese economy, comparative analysis of institutions and organizations.

Professional Affiliations: AEA, Econometric Society (Fellow), Japan Association for Economics and Econometrics (Past President), Founding Editor, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Research Institute, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Government of Japan (President).

http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/aoki.html

泰德利斯，激励理论与企业理论新秀，在声誉理论上始有建树

STEVEN TADELIS Assistant Professor

Ph.D. Harvard University; M.S. Technion; B.A. University of Haifa.

Research Interest: Contract/incentive theory, theory of the firm, industrial organization, game theory.

Current Research: Procurement contracts, firm reputation, theory of the firm.

Representative Recent Publications: (1) 揂 Theory of Partnerships,?(with Jonathan Levin) mimeo, 2002; (2) 揟he Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism,?Journal of Political Economy; August 2002; (3) 揑ncentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement,?(with Patrick Bajari), RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2001; (4) 揥hat抯 in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset,?American Economic Review, June 1999.

Teaching Interests: Contract/incentive theory, game theory, microeconomic theory.

Professional Affiliations: AEA, Econometric Society.

格雷夫，斯坦福教授，强调历史的制度分析

AVNER GREIF Bowman Family Professor in the Humanities and Sciences

Ph.D. Northwestern University; B.A. Tel Aviv University.

Research Interests: European economic history: the historical development of economic institutions, their interrelations with political, social and cultural factors and their impact on economic growth.

Current Research: Institutional development and economic growth in pre-modern Europe.

Representative Recent Publications: (1) 揂nalytic Narratives,?Oxford University Press, 1998; (2) 揅ultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,?The Journal of Political Economy, (October 1994); (3) 揅oordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild? (with Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast), The Journal of Political Economy, (August 1994).

Teaching Interests: European economic history, game theory, industrial organization.

Professional Affiliations: AEA, EHA, ASSHA, Cliometric Society.

米尔格罗姆，斯坦福教授，拍卖理论和比较制度分析大家

PAUL R. MILGROM Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely, Jr. Professor in Humanities and Sciences

Ph.D. (Business), M.S. (Statistics) Stanford University; A.B. University of Michigan (Mathematics).

Research Interests: Microeconomic theory, game theory, comparative institutiona analysis.

Current Research: Incentive theory, planning, auction market design.

Representative Recent Publications: (1) 揚utting Auction Theory to Work,?Journal of Political Economy, April 2000; (2) 揟he LeChatelier Principle,?American Economic Review March 1996;(3) "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, June 1994.

Professional Affiliations: Econometrics Society, AEA, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, and Games and Economic Behavior.

为什么不直接贴上Milgrom的主页呢？www.milgrom.net

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