Maureen F. McNichols (Stanford University), Stephen R. Stubben (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
The Accounting Review 2008
说明:研究公司的earnings management是否影响其内部投资决定;以前很少有这方向的研究
ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial
results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for
a large sample of public companies during the 1978–2002 period and document that
firms that manipulate their earnings—firms investigated by the SEC for accounting
irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that
restated financial statements—over-invest substantially during the misreporting period.
Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent
with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find
similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings
suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external
to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.


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