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A COURSE IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
by Daniel J. Phaneuf and Till Requate
1.1 * Our model of pollution in this chapter assumed that emissions are a pure private bad, and that people have no ability to protect themselves from the adverse consequences of exposure. In reality, individuals can often take private action to mitigate the effective level of pollution. For example, one can stay inside during high ground-level ozone alerts. Consider a generalization of our model in which effective emissions are where
and
di is the amount of time person i devotes to defensive action, such that
The utility function for person i is now and the labor constraint in the economy is l=lx+lz+d1+d2. The production side of
the economy is unchanged.
(a) Derive and interpret the Pareto optimum conditions for this economy.
Derive the conditions for a competitive equilibrium. How do they compare to the Pareto optimum? Is a Pigouvian tax necessary? If so, what form does it take? Is this different from Eq. (1.15)? Is some sort of intervention also necessary to assure the efficient level of defensive effort?
1.2 ** From Figure 1.1 it is clear that the marginal utility cost of pollution for each person at the optimum is
(b) Consider a free market, competitive economy in which each person is endowed with an amount of time T. The person sells time in the labor market at wage w, earns income to spend on x and z, and also uses time (at an opportunity cost of w) to defend against pollution. Under these assumptions each person’s maximization problem is given by
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