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[学以致用] 信任博弈的题目,走过路过看一下,拜托啦!! [推广有奖]

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zongweiyuan 发表于 2019-3-13 09:55:00 |显示全部楼层
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In a trust game, player 1 is given $10. She can send any fraction of that money to player 2. Player 1 keeps the remainder. Whatever money is sent to player 2 is tripled in the process (e.g. if $6 is sent by player 1, then player 2 receives $18). Player 2 then decides how much of the money she receives to return to player 1.

a. When both players maximize their monetary payoff, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game? Explain why the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.

b. Player 1 again maximizes his monetary payoff. But now suppose that player 2 can be

either a trustworthy type or untrustworthy type. Untrustworthy types maximize their

monetary payoff. But trustworthy types always return to player 1 double what player 1

sent. Suppose that player 1 believes that player 2 is a trustworthy type with probability

p.Show that player 1sends $10 to player 2 if p>1/2 and sends zero if p< 1/2

c. Briefly, how could this explain why high trust countries have higher standards of living?




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dave1984 发表于 2019-3-18 21:07:55 |显示全部楼层
zheshi  yipian  hao tiezi   zhichi
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dave1984 发表于 2019-3-18 21:08:13 |显示全部楼层
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