《博弈论与信息》 哈佛 Eric Rasmusen

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GAMES AND INFORMATION, FOURTH EDITION
An Introduction to Game Theory
Eric Rasmusen
Basil Blackwell

Contents1
(starred sections are less important)
List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
   Contents and Purpose
   Changes in the Second Edition
   Changes in the Third Edition
   Using the Book
   The Level of Mathematics
   Other Books
   Contact Information
    Acknowledgements
Introduction
    History
    Game Theory’s Method
    Exemplifying Theory
    This Book’s Style
    Notes
PART 1: GAME THEORY
1 The Rules of the Game
1.1 Definitions
1.2 Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordination
1.5 Focal Points
Notes
Problems


2 Information
2.1 The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game
2.2 Information Sets
2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information
2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games
2.5 Example: The Png Settlement Game
Notes
Problems

3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies
3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game
3.2 Chicken, The War of Attrition, and Correlated Strategies
3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game
3.4 Different Uses of Mixing and Randomizing: Minimax and the Auditing Game
3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game
3.6 Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic
Subsitutes
3.7 Existence of Equilibrium
Notes
Problems

4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
4.1 Subgame Perfectness
4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I
4.3 Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nuisance
Suits
*4.4 Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection
Notes
Problems
5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox
5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem
5.3 Reputation: the One-sided Prisoner’s Dilemma
5.4 Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game

*5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations in the Game of Customer Switching
Costs
*5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game
Notes
Problems
6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III
6.2 Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: the PhD Admissions Game
6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V
6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Gang of Four
Model
6.5 The Axelrod Tournament
*6.6 Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model
Notes
Problems
PART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models
7.2 A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game
7.3 The Incentive Compatibility, Participation, and Competition Constraints
7.4 Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game
Notes
Problems
8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard
8.1 Efficiency Wages
8.2 Tournaments
8.3 Institutions and Agency Problems
*8.4 Renegotiation: the Repossession Game
*8.5 State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II
*8.6 Joint Production by Many Agents: the Holmstrom Teams Model
Notes
Problems
9 Adverse Selection
viii
9.1 Introduction: Production Game VI
9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II
9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV
9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III
*9.5 Market Microstructure
*9.6 A Variety of Applications
Notes
Problems
10 Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and in Moral Hazard with Hidden Information
10.1 The Revelation Principle and Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge
10.2 An Example of Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge: the Salesman Game
*10.3 Price Discrimination
*10.4 Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement
*10.5 The Groves Mechanism
Notes
Problems
11 Signalling
11.1 The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling
11.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education
11.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education
11.4 The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening
*11.5 Two Signals: the Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues
*11.6 Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing
Notes
Problems
PART 3: APPLICATIONS
12 Bargaining
12.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie
12.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
12.3 Alternating Offers over Finite Time
12.4 Alternating Offers over Infinite Time
12.5 Incomplete Information
ix
*12.6 Setting up a Way to Bargain: the Myerson-Satterthwaite Mechanism
Notes
Problems
13 Auctions
13.1 Auction Classification and Private-Value Strategies
13.2 Comparing Auction Rules
13.3 Risk and Uncertainty over Values
13.4 Common-value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse
13.5 Information in Common-value Auctions
Notes
Problems
14 Pricing
14.1 Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited
14.2 Prices as Strategies
14.3 Location Models
*14.4 Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games
*14.5 Durable Monopoly
Notes
Problems
*A Mathematical Appendix
*A.1 Notation
*A.2 The Greek Alphabet
*A.3 Glossary
*A.4 Formulas and Functions
*A.5 Probability Distributions
*A.6 Supermodularity
*A.7 Fixed Point Theorems
*A.8 Genericity
*A.9 Discounting
*A.10 Risk
References and Name Index
Subject Index

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关键词：Rasmusen Rasmuse muse Eric use 博弈论 哈佛 Eric Rasmusen 信息

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finally, i found it~~thanks so much~~

imusic 发表于 2010-4-2 13:38
GAMES AND INFORMATION, FOURTH EDITION
An Introduction to Game Theory
Eric Rasmusen

失效了，可以再发一遍吗