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英文文献："Tying the Manager's Hands": How Firms can make Credible Commitments that make Opportunistic Managerial Intervention Less Likely-《绑住经理的手》:企业如何做出可信的承诺，从而减少机会主义管理干预的可能性
英文文献作者：Kirsten Foss,Nicolai J. Foss,Xose H. Vazquez-Vicente
英文文献摘要：
We discuss and empirically examine a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem of "tying the King s hands", namely how to maximize managerial intervention for "good cause", while avoiding intervention for "bad cause". Managers may opportunistically intervene when such intervention produces private benefits. Overall firm performance is harmed as a result, because opportunistic managerial intervention harms employee motivation. The central point of the paper is that various mechanisms and factors, such as managers staking their personal reputation, employees controlling important assets, strong trade unions, corporate culture, etc. may function as constraints on managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. Thus, firms can make credible commitments that check managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. We derive 5 hypotheses from these ideas, and test them, using path-analysis, on a rich dataset, based on 329 firms in the Spanish food and electric/electronic industries.
我们讨论并实证研究了一个类似于古老的“绑国王的手”的企业层面问题，即如何最大化管理干预的“善因”，同时避免干预的“恶因”。当这种干预产生私人利益时，管理者可能会投机地进行干预。公司的整体绩效因此受到损害，因为机会主义的管理干预损害了员工的动机。本文的中心观点是，各种机制和因素，如管理者对个人声誉的赌注，员工对重要资产的控制，强大的工会，企业文化等，可能会对管理者的机会主义干预倾向起到制约作用。因此，企业可以做出可信的承诺，以遏制管理层的机会主义干预倾向。我们从这些想法中得出了5个假设，并利用路径分析在一个丰富的数据集上对它们进行了测试，该数据集基于西班牙食品和电力/电子行业的329家公司。
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