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[英文文献] Information Networks and Their Role in Threshold Public Goods Games: An Exp... [推广有奖]

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应用力学124 发表于 2006-4-12 09:15:33 |AI写论文

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英文文献:Information Networks and Their Role in Threshold Public Goods Games: An Experimental Study
英文文献作者:Kreitmair, Ursula W.,Banerjee, Simanti,Walker, James M.
英文文献摘要:
In this study, we employ laboratory economic experiments to explore the role information networks play in the collective provision of threshold or provision point public goods. Threshold public goods are those for which a target or threshold level of funds must be raised to make provision possible or economically viable. Many public goods exhibit this characteristic as they may only be provided in discrete quantities. Thresholds or provision points are particularly relevant to environmental public goods, given non-linear ecological processes. In a broader context, the study of contribution behavior for threshold public goods also provides valuable insights into fundraising activities of both national and local profit and not-for-profit agencies, which typically involve provision points. On the basis of a 2x2 full factorial treatment design we test the following hypotheses: 1) Given LOW endowments, localized information will be less effective than full contribution information in meeting the provision point. 2) Given HIGH endowments local information will be as effective as full information to meet the threshold contribution level. 3) In cases where the threshold is met, group members are more likely to make identical contributions in the COMPLETE treatments than in the LOCAL treatments.
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