摘要翻译:
我们将政治分歧可以追溯到“叙述的冲突”这一论点正式化。借鉴“贝叶斯网络”文献,我们将叙事建模为一个因果模型,将行动映射为后果,将其他随机变量的选择编织到故事中。均衡被定义为叙事策略对上的概率分布,该分布使代表代理人的预期效用最大化,抓住了公众舆论倾向于有希望的叙事的想法。我们的平衡分析揭示了主流叙事的结构、它们所涉及的变量、它们所支持的政策以及它们对政治两极分化的贡献。
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英文标题:
《A Model of Competing Narratives》
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作者:
Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler
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最新提交年份:
2018
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives". Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we model a narrative as a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximizes a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that public opinion favors hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain and their contribution to political polarization.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.04232