摘要翻译:
本文研究了不同信息不对称程度下基于经济主体的模型。这个模型非常简单,可以分析,因为购买者只考虑最后一件商品的质量加上她的感知能力beta来评价某件商品的质量。因此,系统按照一个平稳的马尔可夫随机过程演化。卖方提供的产品的价值根据指数\α随质量而增加,指数\α是技术的一种衡量标准。它包含了生产系统的所有技术能力,如教育、科学发展和改变生产力增长的技术。在该模型中,技术水平对于解释信息不对称如何影响市场演化具有重要作用。我们观察到,对于高技术水平,市场可以控制逆向选择。该模型允许我们计算市场崩溃前的最大信息不对称程度。低于这个临界点,市场在非常有限的时间内发展,然后完全消亡。当\beta接近1(对称信息)时,尽管高质量市场和低质量市场并存,但高质量商品的市场变得更有利可图。我们从模型中得到的所有结果都是分析的,最大不对称信息水平是质量评价过程中遍历性崩溃的结果。
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英文标题:
《A Markovian Model Market - Akerlof's Lemmons and the Asymmetry of
Information》
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作者:
Paulo F. C. Tilles, Fernando F. Ferreira, Gerson Francisco, Carlos de
B. Pereira and Flavia Mori Sarti
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最新提交年份:
2009
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分类信息:
一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:General Finance 一般财务
分类描述:Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance
通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用
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英文摘要:
In this work we study an economic agent based model under different asymmetric information degrees. This model is quite simple and can be treated analytically since the buyers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only the quality of the last good purchased plus her perceptive capacity \beta . As a consequence the system evolves according to a stationary Markovian stochastic process. The value of a product offered by the seller increases with quality according to the exponent \alpha, which is a measure of technology. It incorporates all the technological capacity of production systems such as education, scientific development and techniques that change the productivity growth. The technological level plays an important role to explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution in this model. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can control adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum asymmetric information degree before market collapse. Below this critical point the market evolves during a very limited time and then dies out completely. When \beta is closer to 1(symmetric information), the market becomes more profitable for high quality goods, although high and low quality markets coexist. All the results we obtained from the model are analytical and the maximum asymmetric information level is a consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process of quality evaluation.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/0905.0468


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