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摘要翻译：
本文研究了一个加权网络形成模型。双边互动被建模为一个具有平局可能性的Tullock竞赛游戏。我们描述了不同稳定性概念下的稳定网络。我们证明了一个Nash稳定网络要么是空网络，要么是完全网络。完整的网络也不能幸免于双边偏差。当我们考虑有限的远见时，不受双边偏差影响的稳定网络必须是具有不同大小的分区的完全的$m$-分区网络。空的网络是高效的网络。我们提供了几个比较静力学结果，说明网络结构在调节冲击和干预影响方面的重要性。特别地，我们表明平局可能性的增加对社会上浪费的竞赛支出水平具有非单调的影响。就我们所知，本文是第一次尝试当个体的行为既不是战略补充也不是战略替代时，建立加权网络形成模型。
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英文标题：
《A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation》
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作者：
Kenan Huremovic
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a Nash stable network is either the empty network or the complete network. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited farsightedness, stable networks immune to bilateral deviations must be complete $M$-partite networks, with partitions of different sizes. The empty network is the efficient network. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the importance of network structure in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions. In particular, we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw has a non-monotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network formation when the actions of individuals are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.07605
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