摘要翻译:
我们考虑了这样一个游戏,其中玩家搜索一个隐藏的奖品,并且他们关于奖品位置的信息不对称。我们研究了这些博弈均衡中的社会收益。我们给出了产生最优收益(即在任何策略剖面下最高的社会收益)的均衡存在的充分条件,并刻画了最优收益。这些结果对创新竞赛和研发竞赛有有趣的启示。
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英文标题:
《Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information》
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作者:
Gilad Bavly, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.14860