论沙普利-围巾住宅市场的一体化

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摘要翻译：
我们研究了不相交的Shapley-Scarf住房市场合并的福利后果。我们得到了被整合所伤害的代理的数量和他们的损失的大小的严格界限。我们表明，在最坏的情况下，市场一体化可能会损害绝大多数代理人，代理人的住房的平均等级可以渐近地减少他们的偏好列表长度的50%。我们还得到了平均情况的结果。我们精确地计算了随机市场中的期望积分收益，其中每个偏好分布都是均匀随机选择的。我们表明，平均而言，市场一体化有利于所有代理商，特别是那些在较小市场的代理商。我们对被整合所伤害的代理商的预期比例进行了限制，并显示，如果每个市场的规模相同，这一比例小于50%，并且低于26（独立于合并的市场数量）。最后，我们提供了一个偏好域，以确保受到市场一体化损害的是少数人。
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英文标题：
《On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets》
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作者：
Rajnish Kunar, Kriti Manocha, Josue Ortega
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  We study the welfare consequences of merging disjoint Shapley-Scarf housing markets. We obtain tight bounds on the number of agents harmed by integration and on the size of their losses. We show that, in the worst-case scenario, market integration may harm the vast majority of agents, and that the average rank of an agent's house can decrease, asymptotically, by 50% of the length of their preference list.   We also obtain average-case results. We exactly compute the expected gains from integration in random markets, where each of the preference profiles is chosen uniformly at random. We show that, on average, market integration benefits all agents, particularly those in smaller markets. We bound the expected fraction of agents harmed by integration and show that is less than 50% if each market has the same size and this is below 26 (independent of the number of markets that merge). We conclude by providing a preference domain that ensures that those harmed by market integration are a minority.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.09075

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关键词：住宅市场 一体化 Environments Consequences Contribution 比例 相交 markets average 市场