摘要翻译:
虽然博弈论被广泛应用于战略互动的建模,但一个自然的问题是,博弈的表征来自哪里?一个答案是从数据中学习表示。如果一个人想同时学习收益和玩家的策略,一个简单的方法是直接从数据中学习它们。这种方法忽略了这样一个事实,即玩家可能在玩相当好的策略,所以策略和数据之间有联系。本文的主要贡献是在学习的同时进行这种联系。我们将学习问题描述为一个加权约束满足问题,包括收益和策略与数据的拟合以及策略与收益的拟合两个约束。我们使用量子响应平衡作为我们的合理性概念来量化后者的拟合。我们的结果表明,在数据量有限的情况下,引入合理性约束可以改善学习。
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英文标题:
《Learning Game Representations from Data Using Rationality Constraints》
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作者:
Xi Alice Gao, Avi Pfeffer
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最新提交年份:
2012
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分类信息:
一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Artificial Intelligence 人工智能
分类描述:Covers all areas of AI except Vision, Robotics, Machine Learning, Multiagent Systems, and Computation and Language (Natural Language Processing), which have separate subject areas. In particular, includes Expert Systems, Theorem Proving (although this may overlap with Logic in Computer Science), Knowledge Representation, Planning, and Uncertainty in AI. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes I.2.0, I.2.1, I.2.3, I.2.4, I.2.8, and I.2.11.
涵盖了人工智能的所有领域,除了视觉、机器人、机器学习、多智能体系统以及计算和语言(自然语言处理),这些领域有独立的学科领域。特别地,包括专家系统,定理证明(尽管这可能与计算机科学中的逻辑重叠),知识表示,规划,和人工智能中的不确定性。大致包括ACM学科类I.2.0、I.2.1、I.2.3、I.2.4、I.2.8和I.2.11中的材料。
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英文摘要:
While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the players' strategies, a naive approach is to learn them both directly from the data. This approach ignores the fact the players might be playing reasonably good strategies, so there is a connection between the strategies and the data. The main contribution of this paper is to make this connection while learning. We formulate the learning problem as a weighted constraint satisfaction problem, including constraints both for the fit of the payoffs and strategies to the data and the fit of the strategies to the payoffs. We use quantal response equilibrium as our notion of rationality for quantifying the latter fit. Our results show that incorporating rationality constraints can improve learning when the amount of data is limited.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1203.3480