摘要翻译:
提出了一个基于设计者和机构参与者策略交互的两阶段博弈模型的机构自动设计的功能框架,并将其应用于几类不完全信息的两人无限博弈。该框架的核心是一个黑箱优化算法,它指导候选机制的选择过程。我们的方法利用不同的目标函数在几个应用领域中产生最优或接近最优的机制。通过与已知最优机构的比较,以及在某些情况下对已知最优机构的改进,我们提供了证据,证明我们的方法是一种有希望的间接机构参数化设计方法。
---
英文标题:
《Constrained Automated Mechanism Design for Infinite Games of Incomplete
Information》
---
作者:
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
---
最新提交年份:
2012
---
分类信息:
一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
--
一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Artificial Intelligence 人工智能
分类描述:Covers all areas of AI except Vision, Robotics, Machine Learning, Multiagent Systems, and Computation and Language (Natural Language Processing), which have separate subject areas. In particular, includes Expert Systems, Theorem Proving (although this may overlap with Logic in Computer Science), Knowledge Representation, Planning, and Uncertainty in AI. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes I.2.0, I.2.1, I.2.3, I.2.4, I.2.8, and I.2.11.
涵盖了人工智能的所有领域,除了视觉、机器人、机器学习、多智能体系统以及计算和语言(自然语言处理),这些领域有独立的学科领域。特别地,包括专家系统,定理证明(尽管这可能与计算机科学中的逻辑重叠),知识表示,规划,和人工智能中的不确定性。大致包括ACM学科类I.2.0、I.2.1、I.2.3、I.2.4、I.2.8和I.2.11中的材料。
--
---
英文摘要:
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information. At the core of our framework is a black-box optimization algorithm which guides the selection process of candidate mechanisms. Our approach yields optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms in several application domains using various objective functions. By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we provide evidence that ours is a promising approach to parametric design of indirect mechanisms.
---
PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1206.5288


雷达卡



京公网安备 11010802022788号







