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[经济学] 学校择校与大学录取机制的比较 战略录取豁免权 [推广有奖]

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能者818 在职认证  发表于 2022-3-22 17:05:00 来自手机 |AI写论文

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摘要翻译:
最近,世界各地的几十个学区和大学招生系统都对他们的录取规则进行了改革。作为这些改革的一个主要动机,政策制定者列举了规则的战略缺陷:学生有强烈的动机来玩这个系统,这对非战略学生造成了戏剧性的后果。然而,几乎没有一项新规则是策略性的。我们来解释这个谜题。我们发现,在改革之后,规则对策略性录取更加免疫:每个学生可以使用策略进入的学校数量较少,削弱了操纵的动机。同时,每所学校的录取对更多的学生来说都是策略性的,这使得学校更适合非策略性的学生。我们还表明,对Pathak和S\"Onmez(2013)引起的难题的现有解释是不完整的。
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英文标题:
《Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their
  Immunity to Strategic Admissions》
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作者:
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander S. Nesterov
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:

一级分类:Economics        经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
一级分类:Economics        经济学
二级分类:General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述:General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
--
一级分类:Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类:Economics        经济学
分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
--

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英文摘要:
  Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each student received a smaller set of schools that he can get in using a strategy, weakening incentives to manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools more available for non-strategic students. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and S\"onmez (2013) is incomplete.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.06166
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关键词:大学录取 豁免权 Contribution Quantitative SIMULTANEOUS 解释 战略 列举 策略 students

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