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摘要翻译：
我们考虑由一个收入最大化的销售者向多个购买者出售单个商品。Akbarpour和Li最近的工作将\emph{可信度}正式定义为拍卖的要求，并证明了唯一最优的、可信的、策略证明的拍卖是带储备的升价拍卖（Akbarpour和Li,2019）。相反，当买家的估价为MHR时，我们证明了一个密码安全承诺方案的温和附加假设足以满足一个简单的\emph{二轮}拍卖，该拍卖是最优的、策略证明的和可信的（即使竞拍者只知道竞拍者的数量）。我们将我们的分析扩展到当买方估价为$\alpha$-对于任何$\alpha>0美元的情况，最大可信度为任意的$\varepsilon。有趣的是，我们还证明了这种构造不能扩展到规则分布，也不能在多个投标人的情况下删除$\varepsilon$。
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英文标题：
《Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic
Commitments》
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作者：
Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类：Cryptography and Security 密码学与安全
分类描述：Covers all areas of cryptography and security including authentication, public key cryptosytems, proof-carrying code, etc. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes D.4.6 and E.3.
涵盖密码学和安全的所有领域，包括认证、公钥密码系统、携带证明的代码等。大致包括ACM主题课程D.4.6和E.3中的材料。
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一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves (Akbarpour and Li, 2019). In contrast, when buyers' valuations are MHR, we show that the mild additional assumption of a cryptographically secure commitment scheme suffices for a simple \emph{two-round} auction which is optimal, strategyproof, and credible (even when the number of bidders is only known by the auctioneer). We extend our analysis to the case when buyer valuations are $\alpha$-strongly regular for any $\alpha > 0$, up to arbitrary $\varepsilon$ in credibility. Interestingly, we also prove that this construction cannot be extended to regular distributions, nor can the $\varepsilon$ be removed with multiple bidders.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.01598
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