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摘要翻译：
我们给出了一个双边匹配模型的推论，其中市场一方的代理人的特征是由于预匹配投资而内生的。该模型可用于测量劳动力市场摩擦的影响，使用单一横截面的匹配雇主-雇员数据。观察到的工人与企业的匹配是一个离散的、双边匹配过程的结果，在这个过程中，具有不同教育偏好的企业根据与工人对企业偏好相关的指数依次选择工人。教育的分布在贝叶斯博弈的均衡中产生：工人知道工人和企业类型的分布，在匹配过程之前投资于教育。尽管观察到的匹配由于匹配过程而表现出很强的横截面依赖性，但我们提出了一种结合离散选择方法和仿真的渐近有效的推理过程。
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英文标题：
《Schooling Choice, Labour Market Matching, and Wages》
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作者：
Jacob Schwartz
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Econometrics 计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets using a single cross-section of matched employer-employee data. The observed matching of workers to firms is the outcome of a discrete, two-sided matching process where firms with heterogeneous preferences over education sequentially choose workers according to an index correlated with worker preferences over firms. The distribution of education arises in equilibrium from a Bayesian game: workers, knowing the distribution of worker and firm types, invest in education prior to the matching process. Although the observed matching exhibits strong cross-sectional dependence due to the matching process, we propose an asymptotically valid inference procedure that combines discrete choice methods with simulation.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.09020
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