<P>1、John C. Driscoll<BR>Department of Economics, Brown University, Box B, Providence RI 02912. Phone(401) 863-1584, Fax (401) 863-1970, email:John <a href="mailto:Driscoll@brown.edu" target="_blank" >Driscoll@brown.edu</A>, web:http:\\econ.pstc.brown.edu\ ∼jd.</P>
<P>Contents<BR>1 Money and Prices 1<BR>1.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2<BR>1.1.1 Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2<BR>1.1.2 Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2<BR>1.2 The History ofMoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3<BR>1.3 The Demand forMoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4<BR>1.3.1 The Baumol-TobinModel ofMoney Demand . . . . . . . 4<BR>1.4 Money in Dynamic General Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6<BR>1.4.1 Discrete Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<BR>1.4.2 Continuous Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<BR>1.4.3 Solving theModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13<BR>1.5 The optimumquantity ofmoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<BR>1.5.1 The Quantity Theory ofMoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<BR>1.6 Seigniorage, Hyperinflation and the Cost of Inflation . . . . . . . 16<BR>1.7 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21<BR>2 Nominal Rigidities and Economic Fluctuations 27<BR>2.1 Old Keynesian Economics: The Neoclassical Synthesis . . . . . . 28<BR>2.1.1 Open Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31<BR>2.1.2 Aggregate Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33<BR>2.2 DisequilibriumEconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36<BR>2.2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36<BR>2.2.2 TheWalrasian Benchmark Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37<BR>2.2.3 Exogenously Fixed Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38<BR>2.2.4 Exogenously Fixed NominalWage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39<BR>2.2.5 Both prices and wages inflexible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39<BR>2.2.6 Analysis of thismodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40<BR>2.3 Imperfect InformationModels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41<BR>2.4 New KeynesianModels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43<BR>2.4.1 ContractingModels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43<BR>2.4.2 PredeterminedWages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44<BR>2.4.3 FixedWages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47<BR>2.5 Imperfect Competition and New Keynesian Economics . . . . . . 50<BR>2.5.1 Macroeconomic Effects of Imperfect Competition . . . . . 50<BR>2.5.2 Imperfect competition and costs of changing prices . . . . 51<BR>2.5.3 DynamicModels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56<BR>2.6 Evidence and New Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57<BR>2.7 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58<BR>3 Macroeconomic Policy 65<BR>3.1 Rules v. Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66<BR>3.1.1 The Traditional Case For Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66<BR>3.2 TheModern Case For Rules: Time Consistency . . . . . . . . . . 68<BR>3.2.1 Fischer’s Model of the Benevolent, Dissembling Government 68<BR>3.2.2 Monetary Policy and Time Inconsistency . . . . . . . . . 72<BR>3.2.3 Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75<BR>3.3 The Lucas Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77<BR>3.4 Monetarist Arithmetic: Links Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy 79<BR>3.5 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80<BR>4 Investment 87<BR>4.1 The Classical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87<BR>4.2 Adjustment Costs and Investment: q Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 88<BR>4.2.1 The Housing Market: After Mankiw and Weil and Poterba 91<BR>4.3 Credit Rationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93<BR>4.4 Investment and FinancialMarkets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95<BR>4.4.1 The Effects of Changing Cashflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97<BR>4.4.2 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98<BR>4.5 Banking Issues: Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard 99<BR>4.6 Investment Under Uncertainty and Irreversible Investment . . . . 103<BR>4.6.1 Investment Under Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107<BR>4.7 Problems: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109<BR>5 Unemployment and Coordination Failure 117<BR>5.1 Efficiency wages, or why the real wage is too high . . . . . . . . . 117<BR>5.1.1 Solowmodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118<BR>5.1.2 The Shapiro-Stiglitz shirkingmodel . . . . . . . . . . . . 118<BR>5.1.3 Othermodels of wage rigidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120<BR>5.2 Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120<BR>5.2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121<BR>5.2.2 Steady State Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122<BR>5.3 Coordination Failure and Aggregate Demand Externalities . . . . 123<BR>5.3.1 Model set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123<BR>5.3.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125<BR>5.3.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126<BR>5.3.4 Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126<BR>5.4 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127<BR>Continuous-Time Dynamic Optimization 131<BR></P>[/Money]