MIT经济系2011春季学期博弈论课程大纲（博士班课程）

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注意：压缩文件和下面WORD格式的内容都是一样的课程大纲，只需下载一个就可以 syllfinal 14.126 Game Theory, Spring 2011 (graduate).rar (10.82 KB) 本附件包括：

• syllfinal 14.126 Game Theory, Spring 2011 (graduate).doc

2011-10-31 04:14:42 上传

14.126 Game Theory

Mihai Manea and Muhamet Yildiz

TA Gabriel Carroll

Spring 2011

Textbooks

• Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1991. [Primary]
• Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994. [Primary]
• Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press, 2006. [Supplementary]
• Weibull, J., Evolutionary Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1995. [Supplementary]
• Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games, The MIT Press, 1998. [Supplementary]
  

Grading

There will be approximately five problem sets (40% of the grade; tentative due dates are 2/22, 3/16, 4/6, 4/20, and 5/4), and a take-home final exam (60% of the grade; 24h during final exam week with some flexibility).

Tentative Outline

• 2/2-9   Review of Basic Concepts
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Normal-form games (with or without complete information)
  • Dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium (existence and continuity properties), Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  • Extensive form games with perfect information and multi-stage games
  • Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance
    

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 1, 2, 3.

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 6.

• 2/14       Application: Bargaining with Complete Information
  

* Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap. 7.

Rubinstein, A. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 50, 97-109.

• 2/16      Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Sequential equilibrium
  • Perfect and proper equilibria
    

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 8.

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chaps. 11, 12.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.

• 2/22      Signaling and Forward Induction
  

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 8, 11.

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap. 12.

Cho, I.-K. and D. Kreps (1987) “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179-221.

Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2002) “Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning,” Journal of Economic Theory 106, 356-391.

Govindan, S. and R. Wilson (2008) “On Forward Induction,” Econometrica, 77, 1-28.

• 2/23 Application: Signaling in Bargaining
  

* Admati, A. and M. Perry (1987) “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies, 54, 345-364.

• 2/28-3/9 Repeated Games
  

Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 5.

Mailath and Samuelson, Chaps. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11.

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990) “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica, 58, 1041-1063.

Abreu, D., P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce (1991) “Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships,” Econometrica, 59, 1713-1733.

Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin (1986) “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, 54, 533-554.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994) “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica, 62, 997-1039.

• 3/14      Reputation Formation
  

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 9.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982) “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982) “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245-252.

Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1989) “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,” Econometrica, 57, 759-778.

• 3/16      Application: Screening and Reputation in Bargaining
  

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 10.

Gul, F, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Wilson (1986), “Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture,” Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 155-190.

Abreu, D. and F. Gul (2000) “Bargaining and Reputation,” Econometrica, 68, 85-117.

• 3/28-30 Rationalizability
  

* Lecture Notes

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap. 12.

Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 8, 9, 11.

Bernheim, D. (1984) “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 1007-1028.

Pearce, D. (1984) “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,” Econometrica, 52, 1029-1050.

Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) “A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements”, Econometrica, 75(2), 365-400.

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关键词：MIT 经济系 博弈论 博士班 econometrica 课程 2011 博弈论 经济系 博士

10.         4/4-11 Supermodular Games and their applications
* Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990) “Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, 58, 1255-1277.
* Vives, X. (2005) “Complementarities and Games: New Developments,” Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 437-479.
* Topkis, D. M. (1998) Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press.

Van Zandt, T. and X. Vives (2007) “Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory, 34, 339-360.

11.         4/13-27 Global Games and their applications
* Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2003) “Global Games: Theory and Applications,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society), edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky.  Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
* Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993) “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econometrica, 61, 989-1018.
* Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998) “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Attacks,” American Economic Review, 88, 587-597.
Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner (2003) “Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory, 108, 1-44.

12.         5/2    Review

13.         5/4-9 Learning and Evolutionary Foundations
* Weibull, Chaps. 2, 3.
* Fudenberg and Levine, Chaps. 4, 5, 6.
* Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993) “Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria in Games,” Econometrica, 61, 29-56.
* Ellison, G. (1993) “Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination,” Econometrica, 61, 1047-1071.
Möbius, M. (2000) “The Formation of Ghettos as a Local Interaction Phenomenon.”
Ellison, G. (2002) “Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory,” Journal of Political Economy, 110, 994-1034.
Sandholm, W. (2002) “Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 667-689.

14.         5/11         Review

不错，帮顶。

该课程两位教师 Mihai Manea and Muhamet Yildiz

Mihai Manea 是罗马尼亚人，中学六次罗马尼亚中学生数学竞赛金牌得主，三次巴尔干地区数学竞赛金牌得主，三次国际中学生数学奥林匹克竞赛金牌得主。

2005年本科毕业于普林斯顿大学经济系（最优荣誉毕业生），辅修金融、应用数学和计算数学。

2009年哈佛大学经济系博士毕业。Review of Economic Studies Tour, 2009  （参加这个欧洲之旅的被认为是当年美国毕业的最优秀的6—7位经济系、金融系博士）

2009秋季至今任教于MIT经济系

http://econ-[url]www.mit.edu/faculty/manea[/url]

Papers

Bargaining in Dynamic Markets with Multiple Populations

Axioms for the Shapley Value   

Bargaining in Stationary Networks, American Economic Review 2011

Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks (with Dilip Abreu), forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory

Markov Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks (with Dilip Abreu), forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior

Trade Mechanisms with Independent Discrete Types (with Nenad Kos)

Destruction and Mechanism Design (with Eric Maskin)   

Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (with Fuhito Kojima),  Econometrica 2010

Incentives in the Probablistic Serial Mechanism (with Fuhito Kojima),  Journal of Economic Theory 2010

Asymptotic Ordinal Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship, Theoretical Economics 2009

Unique Induced Preference Representations, Journal of Mathematical Economics 2008

A Constructive Proof of the Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem, Journal of Economic Theory 2008

Random Serial Dictatorship and Ordinally Efficient Contracts, International Journal of Game Theory 2008

Serial Dictatorship and Pareto Optimality, Games and Economic Behavior 2007

Core Tâtonnement, Journal of Economic Theory 2007



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另一位是Muhamet Yildiz ，MIT经济系教授。土耳其裔


土耳其裔的厉害经济学家不少，MIT经济系的ACEMOUGLU也是

可以参照这个课程表和参考书进行自学了。

初学者不适用哦。。。

crozame 发表于 2011-11-5 03:29
初学者不适用哦。。。

确实不适用  这是MIT经济系开给研究“微观经济理论”方向的博士课程，其他研究方向（比如发展经济学、应用微观、宏观）的博士生都不用必修这课程。一般的博弈论内容已经在所有博士生都必需的高级微观课程中有介绍。


当然，本科生初学者有几本很好的博弈论教材，比如奥斯本的 博弈论导论 等等

过段时间要回家了   先马克

博弈论教材研究生的这些年新书不多

赞！